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In the Twenty-first Century, there are myriad opportunities for adherents of different 
traditions to exchange ideas. At the same time, such opportunities are accompanied by 
the difficulty of understanding one another. Universalists assert that we should go 
beyond cultural differences by emphasizing similarities among traditions. Particularists 
object. Although tensions endure, seemingly universal principles of human conduct, 
especially those based on western traditions (e.g. human rights principles), are asserted 
without understanding other cultures. For universalists, universal norms should be 
everyone‟s concern; the issue is how local communities can incorporate them into their 
particular cultural matrix.  
 The debate on moral universalism and cultural particularism conventionally sets a 
dichotomy between western universal morality and all other local traditions. However, it 
can be said that universal norms are never “universal” in origin but are located in some 
locally and historically specific moral tradition. Following this line of thinking, this 
thesis reassesses a fixed dichotomy between western moral universalism and 
particularism. In asserting the universal significance of their truth, universalists ignore 
the existence of other moral traditions that also contain universal attributes. This 
ignorance may explain why universalists resort to biased persuasion in cross-cultural talk 
which leads us to the second reassessment. Instead of biased or of what I call preclusive 
persuasion, the thesis advances the idea of voluntary recognition as a method of cross-
cultural discussion. 
 To discuss the point above, this thesis examines Shinto as an example of a local 
tradition that endorses universally applicable morality. My research suggests that Shinto 
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morality has both universal and particular elements: there is a universally applicable 
morality in the name of particular practice. In this light, I suggest reconsidering the 
conventional paradigm of the universalism versus particularism debate. To corroborate 
this point of the discussion, other features of Shinto are outlined. That is, Shinto‟s 
universally applicable morality nonetheless embraces culturally specific ideas that entail 
Shinto‟s vision of ideal human character. This character can be attained by a person‟s 
own efforts. As Shinto morality aims at reaching the maximum degree of internal 
perfection, I suggest that it is best pursued voluntarily.  
 In the case of Shinto, I propose that there is no fixed point of departure, either 
universal or particular. I further question the mindset of those who believe that their 
moral tradition is fundamental to all morality. Rather than challenging already widely 
established universal principles, this thesis aspires to reconfigure the predominant mode 
of cross-cultural conversation toward a more flexible understanding of different 
traditions. As the case of Shinto demonstrates, there is more than one universally 
applicable morality and there could be many understandings of each. Hence there is no 
single, exclusive method of cross-cultural dialogue: what matters is cultural context, 
which in the case of Shinto is the method of voluntary recognition. Other moral traditions 









A Justification for the Philosophical Analysis of Morality. Certain ideas concerning the 
human good, such as that all human beings are entitled to fall under the legislation of 
morally-grounded human rights that protect their basic liberties, or that there are certain 
minimal principles of distributive justice, are becoming universal norms in the sense that 
they are deemed to apply to everyone and to override contrary local norms. With the 
benefit of hindsight, one can see that arguments for the formulation of such universal 
norms have gone in two directions, one practical and the other theoretical. Some scholars, 
who examine the varying degrees to which notions of the human good are respected 
across the world-as seen, for example, in better or worse human rights records or levels 
of poverty in different parts of the world-seek pragmatic solutions to the problem of how 
to apply universal norms to resolve local problems. Others, although they share the same 
concern for the human good with pragmatic universalists, focus on the cultural origin or 
local compatibility of “universal norms”.1 
For pragmatic universalists, a philosophical discussion makes a long detour 
toward the goal of improving people‟s life conditions. As Jau-Hwa Chen observes, 
people around the world, even if their own state policy is illiberal, have been fighting for 
freedom and liberty, which proves that the pursuit of human rights is based on universal 
interests. Hence, it is important to move on from merely lingering upon philosophical 
                                                          
1. What I call pragmatic universalists are scholars, such as Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer, who 
go beyond philosophical discussions to find immediate solutions for global problems. 
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inquiries toward ensuring that all governments live up to human rights principles.
2
 
Pragmatic universalists hold that in reality all people on the globe fight for the human 
good. To give an example of “freedom”, the cultural origin of the concept of human 
rights does not constitute the primary issue which lies in the universalist/particularist 
debate because whatever one calls it, people everywhere have envisioned freedom.
3
 In 
the eyes of pragmatic universalists, there is less difference between moral traditions than 
people usually think there is.  
As a matter of fact, there is much advocacy and campaigning for the sake of the 
human good, for example, in China. Meanwhile, it is also true that many western human 
rights proponents do not pay much attention to how ordinary Chinese people understand 
freedom, rights, and other concerns for the human good. Thus, scenarios occur in which 
western human rights activists reprimand China and the Chinese people for their 
apparently poor human rights records. The disruption of the torch rally by activists at the 
2008 Olympic Games in Beijing is still fresh in our memory. The ensuing debate over 
whether western state officials should or should not attend the opening ceremony shows 
that in the light of universal events, frictions are never a far cry from erupting despite 
common economic interests.  
The West‟s concerns over China as the host of the Olympic Games can be 
explained as the former‟s misunderstanding of cultural differences. Along with their 
commitment to human rights principles, ignorance and intolerance might have inspired 
                                                          
2. In “Asia Values? Why Not, But How?”, Chen uses the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the case 
for the Taiwanese activist, Cheng Nan-jung, who struggles for freedom of expression, as 




anti-Chinese protesters although these protests are mainly directed at the government and 
not the Chinese per se.  To discuss a question, such as “on what grounds do human rights 
activists antagonize the Chinese who pursue their own definition of the human good?”, 
one should go beyond the details of a particular people‟s fight for freedom and human 
rights. To understand that there are different notions of human rights emanating from 
different cultural backgrounds, one needs to broaden the discussion through the lens of 
philosophical inquiry by attempting to fathom the underlying reasons behind human 




The Argument of the Thesis. The main subject of my thesis is the debate on moral 
universalism and cultural particularism, a much discussed subject of political philosophy. 
For some, the cause of tension between universalism and particularism lies with state boundaries. 
Some scholars, such as Charles Beitz and Martha Nussbaum, argue that a concern for the human 
good should transcend state boundaries, which are irrelevant to an effort of benefitting humanity 
at large.
5
 The fact that the state often fails to protect its citizens further invites discussion 
of the rights and duties of human beings everywhere. Others, however, situate the 
universalist/particularist debate on the local adaptability of international human rights principles. 
I pay attention to the latter‟s concern in order to open a way toward understanding the 
relationship between universal morality and local traditions. 
The thesis identifies two distinguishable universalisms in the context of morality: 
1) the assumption that a certain morality is ubiquitously significant, and 2) the prospect 
                                                          
4. For the role of political philosophy, see Chan, “Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights”, 
126-128; Nardin, “International Political Theory and the Question of Justice.” 
5 . Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Nussbaum, “Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism”; Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism.”  
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of a shared universal morality based on the exchange of multiple ideas. The first rests on 
the claim that, for instance, locals believe their morality to be applicable to all humanity 
regardless of cultural differences. (I define “applicability” as the notion that all people on 
the globe are expected to respect a common morality that is binding on all mankind.) To 
give an example, the idea of human rights is universally applicable because it consists of 
rights that people have not as members of this or that society but simply as human beings. 
This type of universalism is meant to be self-evident, not a product of consensus. In 
contrast, particularists, who defend local practices against the universalist stance, 
question whether a universal morality can prevail over local tradition. Universalism, 
when it advances a particular set of principles as binding on all human beings, results in 
tension between universalists and particularists, who see themselves as defending local 
practices.  
Alternatively one can think of that there are probably many sources of moral 
principles that are universally applicable, other than human rights or natural law, 
including principles found within Confucianism, Judaism,
6
 and, as I hold, Shinto. This 
possibility for the plurality of universal moralities points us toward the second type of 
universalism: a common morality recognized by everyone that can be distinguished from 
self-asserting universal morality. One can argue that this second type of universalism is 
still in a formative stage, as seen in the pros and cons of how to conceive universal 
human rights principles.   
I start with the first type, a self-asserting universalism that requires every 
individual to respect an assumed universal morality. The objective for a critical 
                                                          
6. Sen, “Human Rights and Asian Values”; Walzer, “Universalism and Jewish Values.”  
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assessment of the first type of universalism would be to shed light on the possible 
plurality of universal moralities. That is, there could be universally applicable systems of 
principles other than those of human rights and natural law. Conventionally, the 
universalist/particularist dichotomy is a framework of the debate in which the 
“universalist” pushes the “particularist” to embrace the former‟s preferred universal 
morality or the latter presses the former to recognize cultural differences. Yet assigning 
fixed identities to universalist and particularist moralities excludes the possibility that 
universal morality may also exist in “particularist” traditions. Therefore, my thesis 
questions a fixed dichotomy in traditions, namely that they must be either universal or 
particular, to view the debate on moral universalism and cultural particularism from a 
different angle.  
By suggesting a possibility that there are many traditions that embrace the first 
type of universalism, I raise a question about understanding differences: “how one can 
recognize elements in other people‟s moral traditions that apply to everyone?” (Of course, 
it is important to understand other people‟s moral traditions, regardless of whether or not 
they have universal significance. Yet my thesis focuses on universal morality rather than 
morality in general. This is because the tension between the universalist and particularist 
stance intensifies over the matter of recognizing universal morality.) For understanding 
of other traditions, I propose voluntary recognition as the mode of cross-cultural 
understanding in which the adherents of different traditions learn from each other in a 
way that may create possibilities for genuine universal principles about the human good.
7
 
                                                          
7. There is a possibility that cross-cultural conversation brings tension between different people 
rather than harmony. However, my thesis does not forgo opportunities for cross-cultural talks but 
seeks a method of the talk which works for mutual understanding. 
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In other words, I criticize the self-asserting type of universalism and argue in favour of 
promoting a universal morality based on the exchange of ideas.   
Scholars argue that mutual understanding or persuasion are methods that can 
bring about the second type of universalism (i.e. universally recognized principles). Both 
rule out coercion as a means to promote moral universalism.
8
  As a practice, mutual 
understanding involves an attempt to understand ethical diversity. The word 
understanding (defined as “the human capacity of comprehending the nature of reality”) 
is synonymous with “sympathetic awareness or tolerance”.9 Anthony Appiah and David 
Miller, the advocates of mutual understanding, argue that one can be a universalist and 
keep a local faith.
10
 To be fair to one‟s own and others‟ views, there is no need to rank 
the principles.  
However, the method of persuasion is not the same as mutual understanding. The 
act of persuasion means “to make somebody believe that something is true”.11 In the 
context of the universalist problem with particularism, the subject of persuasion 
represents the truth of the universalist: universalists‟ belief is right to other people as well. 
Of course, one can argue that persuasion does not rely on force. Will Kymlicka, for 
example, writes that persuasion (and example) is an alternative method to imposition for 
propagating one‟s morals on the meeting ground of different ethical traditions. To 
                                                          
8. Mutual understanding is suggested by scholars, such as Charles Taylor in “Conditions of an 
Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” and Anthony Appiah in Cosmopolitanism. Will 
Kymlicka in “Introduction” claims that persuasion is the main method for open dialogue.  
9.  Kemerling, Philosophy Pages; Oxford University Press, Concise Oxford Dictionary.  
10. Both Appiah in Cosmopolitanism and Miller in National Responsibility and Social Justice 
suggest mutual understanding in the context of the confrontation between cosmopolitan 
universalism and patriotism. 
11. Oxford University Press, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 
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distinguish persuasion from imposition, Kymlicka presumes the persuaded party‟s 
voluntary conversion at the end of persuasion. However, persuasion would involve more 
or less a risk of being manipulative or even deceptive because it is designed to propagate 
one‟s belief. It is no exaggeration to say that with the purpose of propagating his truth, 
the persuader pushes the interlocutor to adopt his morality.
12
 In the context of the 
universalist problem with particularism, I want to highlight that universalists have a 
tendency to rely on a biased persuasion.
13
 Rather than denying persuasion altogether, I 
introduce the term preclusive persuasion which connotes that universalists, who strongly 
believe in the irrevocable veracity of their ideas, tend to be preclusive because they 
exclude the possibility of truths other than their own.  
My thesis is intended to vindicate the concept of voluntary recognition as an 
alternative to preclusive persuasion. One can say that preclusive persuasion is a 
monologue in the sense that the primary objective is to convince the interlocutor. 
Voluntary recognition, on the other hand, matches the image of a dialogue in which a 
conversation between two parties takes place on the same footing and different 
viewpoints are exchanged and recognised as such.
14
 In other words, people from different 
                                                          
12. Kymlicka, “Introduction,” 9-10. 
13. Particularists as well as universalists can be biased persuaders. However, I focus on 
universalists because they seem to go beyond a defense of their rightness to advocating the 
propagation of their truths globally. 
14. Fred Dallmayr, in line with Gadamer and Habermas, has already proposed a similar practise 
of cross-cultural understanding. Dallmayr argues that the advocates of western moral 
universalism and its opponents denounce each other by using different concepts and different 
languages. Neither is absolutely right nor wrong because they are contesting the superiority of 
different subjects, either legalistic rights talk or individual enlightenment. What each party needs 
is to change its mind from preaching its own rightness to learning from the other‟s claims. My 
thesis follows the same line as Dallmayr but stresses that cross-cultural learning should be 
voluntary. Dallmayr, “„Asian values‟ and Global Human Rights.” 
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traditions converse and interchange information about those traditions without aspiring to 
impose their own moral truth. An expected end is also voluntary learning, but the process 
differs from preclusive persuasion.  
Voluntary recognition could be an alternative or supplementary method for open 
dialogue held by the adherents of different traditions. It could be an alternative to 
preclusive persuasion for the following reasons. First, a universally applicable element in 
local morality cannot be the utmost justification for a persuading party who seeks the 
universal recognition of its morality. This is because all morality is locally invented; 
therefore, there is no given, free-standing, context-independent idea at the first place.
15
 A 
morality might be universally true, but it would still bear the signs of its emergence in a 
specific context so that its universal recognition is hardly convincing to all the people on 
the globe. Because universal applicability and recognition are distinct,
16
 the reasons for 
universal recognition should rely on other reasons than mere universal applicability.  
Second, morality might be practiced as an ethic of individual conduct rather than 
as a law for everyone in a society. Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto morality are 
beneficial to those in the quest of enriching their own moral requirements. In fact, the 
Japanese definition of morality 道徳 (Dotoku) constitutes two characters, 道 (the way 
to/of) and 徳 (virtue), that is to deal with individual‟s internal character.17 In other words, 
                                                          
15. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism.  
16. Nardin, “Justice and Coercion,” 251.  
17. Dotoku is given as a translation of morality in the Japanese-English Dictionary edited by 
Konishi and Minamide, Genius Eiwa Daijiten; cf. Niimura, Kojien. Although some meaning of 
Dotoku embraces the same definition with that in English (i.e. “a system of moral principles 
followed by a particular group of people.” Oxford University Press, Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary.), my thesis highlights other notions of Dotoku: a way to deal with one‟s internal 
character or cultivate virtue. However, one should note that Dotuku as the subject of the Japanese 
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Dotoku is comparable to self-discipline. Therefore, I suggest that it is best recognized as 
one‟s own: a matter of internal motivation and character as well as external conduct.  
Voluntary recognition might fail, however, when open dialogue seeks to create 
shared principles because the decision-making process necessarily involves at least a 
degree of persuasion. But even if it is not an active contributor to cross-cultural 
discussion, voluntary recognition can be an option that individuals choose in response to 
the persuader. In other words, the persuader who tries to convince the interlocutor of his 
moral excellence should be aware that the latter makes the final decision whether they 
agree or disagree with the former‟s moral enthusiasm. In short, morality, when it is more 
related to one‟s self-discipline than to one‟s obligation, can be better recognized 
voluntarily than attained through the persuader‟s influence. 
 
Chapter Organization. To explore these arguments, the first chapter begins with a self-
asserting type of moral universalism (it should be noted that the definition of morality in 
Chapter One corresponds to the meaning of that word in English). The examples 
employed in the chapter are natural law and human rights, which are universally 
applicable moralities because they postulate a universal faculty of human beings (human 
rationality) and rights of every human. Because the principles of natural law and human 
rights presuppose western moral experience and traditions, those who are unfamiliar with 
western concepts may not recognize these principles. In other words, natural law and 
human rights are universally applicable moralities without having universal recognition. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
education system is the term disseminated throughout Japan only after 1945. Section 3.2.3 
discusses Japan‟s moral cultivation in a different time span. 
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I want to stress that not all universalists press others to recognize what they propose as 
“universal morality”. Nonetheless, some universalists attempt to legitimize universal 
recognition of natural law or human rights on the grounds of their universal applicability. 
I focus on such universalists and call their belief western moral universalism, to 
distinguish them from other universally applicable moralities.
18
   
It can be said that the western moral universalist‟s project to defend “universal 
morality” invites local resistance when it posits that local communities should have the 
same understanding of that morality. From a perspective of social constructivism, 
however, what some claim to be universal principles are in fact the principles of a 
particular local community projected globally. A local moral claim for universal 
recognition raises one question: “What types of moral universalisms are there outside the 
western tradition?” A belief in plurality of universally applicable moralities across 
traditions leads to another: “How does one understand or even recognize the other 
people‟s (universal) moralities?”  
To delve into the two enquiries above, Section 1.2 will examine a case study, the 
Asian values debate. Reviewing the stance of both universalist critics who advocate 
human rights principles and opponents who insist on the supremacy of “Asian values”, 
the section focuses on two kinds of universalist critical perspectives. The first type of 
universalist critic negates the Asian values debate as a political manipulation, which 
invalidates the traditions of certain peoples. The second type admits local interpretations 
of human rights principles but remains staunch in its belief in that the principles are 
                                                          
18 . There are other types of western moral universalism, such as Kantian morality and 
utilitarianism. However, to avoid overburdening my thesis with distinctions and concerned about 
the word limit, I focus on human rights principles and natural law.  
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absolute. Insisting on a firm assumption of human rights, they overlook the possibility 
that local moral principles might be universally applicable yet not recognized outside that 
tradition. Moreover, the universalist perspective is set within a dichotomy—western 
moral universalism and the rest (i.e. “non-westerns” or “locals”)—to demonstrate how a 
proposed common morality can be applied on the local level.   
One way to discuss the plurality of universally applicable moralities could be to 
study what appear to be culturally particular traditions in order to discern the elements of 
universal morality from within. Social scientists have done much research on “eastern” 
cultural traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism.  Scholars such as Sen 
and Walzer already came to the conclusion that “eastern” cultures and Judaism can be 
compatible with the western tradition: “There are many different universalisms, many 
different idioms in which similar universal values can be and have been expressed.” 19 
Following the same line of analysis, my thesis examines Shinto. Introducing Shinto 
morality is worthwhile because it has been neglected in the field of political philosophy.  
I single out Shinto from many other Japanese social practices because Shinto is 
one of the distinct Japanese traditions and is therefore of great significance in the context 
of Japanese society (the subject of Chapter Two). Among the many periods of Shinto 
history, Shintoism under the Meiji government, which served to advance Japanese 
expansionism, was notoriously parochial. It undoubtedly falls into the category of 
preclusive persuasion. However, the focal point in my thesis is the post-1945 Shrine 
Shinto and its moral teaching, which is consistent with the idea of voluntary recognition.  
It seems noteworthy that leading Shinto experts, such as John Breen and Mark Teeuwen, 
                                                          
19. Walzer, “Universalism and Jewish Values.” 
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argue that we think of today as “Shinto” is a product of the period between the late 
Nineteenth and the early Twentieth Century. Their point is not to erase Shinto from the 
list of Japan‟s ancestral traditions, but to stress that ancient Kami-cults, 20  though 
practiced in early Japan, were not established as “Shinto” from the beginning.21 In this 
sense, it would be incorrect to describe Shinto as a single religion that unchangeably 
continued throughout history. Alternatively, one can argue that the origin of today‟s 
Shinto was already seen as the form of Kami-cults in early Japan, which took over the 
centuries to form the present day‟s Shrine Shinto. In other words, there were Kami 
related concepts and practices or beliefs in early Japan and much later people came to 
recognize or reinvented them as Shinto or Shintoism. As I discuss in Chapter Two, such 
changeability over time is in fact a feature of tradition. Therefore, by including all 
changes that occurred in Shinto history, for the sake of consistency I will keep the term 
Shinto to refer to Kami-cults that have been present throughout Japanese history.  
Another caution about Japanese tradition should be paid to the perception of 
Japan and Japaneseness. In fact, by attempting to determine a particular culture and 
tradition in Japanese society, one may reach a stereotypical view on Japanese 
particularity, for example, that Japan is a “communitarian society”. However, such 
claims are ethnocentric and lack scientific proof. Moreover, they mistakenly confuse a 
                                                          
20. The meaning of Kami is broad, although translatable as God or deity in English. There are 
various types of the Kami: it could be the Kami of nature, such as the Kami of mountain. The 
Kami could also have earthly character as seen in deities in Japanese myth. The Kami could be 
supernatural being, such as Death. Because Shinto does not recognize absolute difference 
between the Kami and human beings, one can make an effort to gain the same respect as the 
Kami. For example, Yasukuni shrine is dedicated to the souls of those who died for Japan. 
Further details about the Kami in Abe, Shinto ga yoku wakaru Hon. 
21 . International Shinto Foundation, Shinto-Its Universality, 95; Breen and Teeuwen, New 
History of Shinto.  
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national character with a national tradition. Although there is no single unified 
Japaneseness, Shinto customs have penetrated every layer of the daily life of the 
Japanese (Subsection 2.1.3). In fact, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.3, Shinto morality is 
familiar to all the Japanese. Shinto morality as advocated by Shintoists has been brought 
to the masses through moral cultivation. Therefore, Shinto can be highlighted as a 
particular element of the Japanese cultural tradition.  
For the Japanese, Shinto has both secular and religious connotations, which 
marks one of the limitations of the thesis. It is difficult to draw a clear line between 
secular and religious rituals or morals because Shinto represents both social customs and 
religious practices. On the one hand, one can say that Shinto‟s seasonal Matsuri are 
festivals in which Japanese participate as a communal practice and which transcend 
personal religious beliefs. On the other, The Three Foundation Principles and Shinto 
Edification, a statement of Shinto religious doctrine prepared under the supervision of the 
Association of Shinto Shrines, can be seen as a symbol of the religious discipline. 
Although both represent Shinto traditions, social customs are probably better known and 
more widespread than the religious practices in general. Therefore, when one views 
Shinto as a Japanese tradition, one should remember that there is a degree to which 
Shinto tradition is based on social customs that everyone routinely practices and which 
are related to moral codes that are particular to Shintoism.  
Another limitation is the use of general terms in the thesis, such as Japanese 
society, western tradition, eastern philosophy and so forth. These terms can embrace 
more than one meaning because they are used in different contexts. One can ask “what is 
„Japanese society‟” when the Japanese are ethnically and culturally diverse? The 
14 
 
definition of East and West are controversial, as Subsection 1.2.2 briefly suggests. Even 
the use of the term particular tradition might cause the misunderstanding that tradition is 
either a universal or a particular practice and cannot be both. As Seyla Benhabib argues, 
cultural practices often contradict one another within a tradition. For example, the 
subjugation of women in Bangladesh or the Indian caste system look like particular 
traditions to foreigners but this does not mean that all Bangladeshis and Indians have no 
objection to the practice.
22
 As I emphasize in Chapter Two, a tradition can persist 
through the generations despite disagreements within. Because the space is limited, the 
thesis cannot deconstruct the meanings of all general descriptions. Therefore, although 
the use of some terms may be contested, I still rely on some general terms throughout the 
paper.  
As a response to the questions posed in Chapter One, Chapter Three is dedicated 
to 1) arguing that an assumed stance in tradition either universal or particular is 
improper and 2) suggesting voluntary recognition as a mode of cross-cultural discussion 
that aims to understand cultural differences. The supporting evidence for the first point is 
that Shinto morality embraces universally applicable moralities. Post-war Shrine Shinto 
has appropriated the idea of the human good, which originates from western traditions, 
by actively participating in UN Conferences.
23
 One of the reasons why Shrine Shinto 
voluntarily accepted a western conception of the human good is that it was relevant to 
Shinto‟s original universal morality.  
                                                          
22 . Benhabib, “Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical 
Community.”  
23. By “war”, I mean the Second World War throughout my thesis.  
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Shinto endorses not only borrowed western ideas, but also its own original 
universality, namely, the concept of being pure in mind and body. This is Shinto‟s unique 
universalism—anyone can learn to live according to its principles. Therefore, it can be 
said that Shinto‟s universality is a part of a particular tradition. Despite its universal 
applicability, however, it may be too unfamiliar to be understood by non-Japanese. In 
other words, it is unlikely to be an international standard, given that the universal concept 
of being pure in mind and body originates from the concept of Kami, a unique Japanese 
idea. It is, moreover, aimed at enriching an individual‟s attitude in life. Therefore, 
pushing for its recognition by means of preclusive persuasion seems to be a rather 
imposing, even implicitly coercive act. On the contrary, Shinto morality is supposed to 
be cultivated in one‟s own way. These two features, its Japanese particularity and 
voluntary character, support the second argument for voluntary recognition of other 
people‟s morality. In the case of Shinto‟s universal morality, I deem voluntary rather 
than persuasive methods to be appropriate modes of teaching morality to those who do 
not yet know Shinto as the learning must come from the learner, not the teacher.  
Engaging in the critical assessment of universalists and their efforts at persuasion 
does not mean that I attempt to deny the significance of human rights principles, or 
disrespect an effort to achieve a consensus by the adherents of different traditions. Rather, 
when local people are uncomfortable with those universalists who persuade others of 
their moral truth, this is not because the local people dislike the idea of the universalists. 
In fact, it could be a matter of mutual recognition: the former is suspicious about the 
latter as the latter immediately attempts to convince them of the irrevocable universal 
validity of his viewpoint before even making the slightest effort to understand anything 
16 
 
about them. In fact, the local people concerned may also embrace a kind of universal 
morality based on different traditions, hence different in outlook.  Indeed, as mentioned 
earlier, mutual understanding is about understanding each other. Also, I believe that a 
voluntarily recognized morality could be more stable and true than an accepted morality 
that was brought about through preclusive persuasion from politically and economically 
powerful people. Therefore, the aim of my thesis does not stop with a critical review of 
universalist standpoints. It also seeks to build a bridge between moral universalism and 
cultural particularism by introducing Shinto morality and its universal aspects to the field 















Chapter 1 The Debate on Moral Universalism and Cultural Particularism 
 
1.1  Western Moral Universalism  
This section attempts to evaluate the usual association of moral universalism with 
western moral traditions, those of natural law and human rights in particular. The section, 
however, argues that there can be many universally applicable moral traditions and that 
the identification of moral universalism with natural law and human rights is arbitrary. 
 
1.1.1 Applicability and Recognition of Universal Principles. In the western intellectual 
tradition, morality is considered to be “a standard for judging systems of mores”.24 If 
morality is not specific to certain people but a standard for all the people on the globe, 
and a standard for judging the mores of particular peoples, it can be called universal 
morality. In a philosophical sense, universal is understood as “a concept of general 
application”.25 One example of universal morality is natural law, namely the idea based 
on the moral grounds of human rationality applicable to all human beings. Since the 
faculty of reasoning is common to all human beings, the principles identified as those of 
natural law are applicable to people even outside the western tradition. It is noteworthy 
that natural law is a universal idea in the sense that it is universally applicable, not that it 
is universally accepted: one simply assumes that the concept of natural law is a bond 
                                                          
24. Donagan, Theory of Morality, 2.  
25. The term universalism usually denotes religious faith, namely “a theological doctrine that all 
human beings will eventually be saved”.  Merriam-Webster Incorporated, Merriam-Webster 
Online. The subject of my thesis is moral universalism, therefore, I employ a philosophical 
meaning of universal. Oxford University Press, Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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formed by rational man, therefore, it is a man‟s universal obligation. This systematic 
belief is moral universalism; the principle under which one self-evidently affirms the 
universal applicability of a morality (i.e. the principle of universal morality).
26
  
There is another view of morality, however, namely morality as an invention. 
According to this view, any kind of morality, whether universally applicable or locally 
specific, is simply a body of principles that has emerged from particular contexts, 
including historical backgrounds and philosophers‟ viewpoints. Natural law, for instance, 
embraces universally applicable principles, but has been shaped and reshaped in 
particular historical contexts. Indeed, the universal principle of man‟s rationality was 
God-given for Christian thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, and it was only later given a 
secular interpretation in elaborating the idea of human rights.  In respect to natural law, it 
can be said that moral universalism is particular in terms of its origin, although universal 
in its principles.   
The term universalism can be used in two different ways: to advance a factual 
claim and a philosophical one. The universal principle as a fact applies to mathematical 
and scientific discoveries, such as the circular constant, which is universally recognized 
by those able to understand it. In a philosophical sense, a universal principle expresses 
someone‟s or some group‟s claims. So when it is applicable to all the people on the globe 
                                                          
26. It should be noted that the legitimacy of a moral‟s universality depends on the subject. For 
example, Chandran Kukathas in “Mirage of Global Justice” argues that there is no universal 
value in the world because the common themes shared by all people, such as love or friendship, 
are differently construed and practiced by different people accordingly. Certainly, value which 
represents an individual‟s credos about what is right and wrong to him, or what is important in 
his life is not identical with principles that are accepted beliefs among diverse people, which 
influence their actions. However, what I focus upon in my thesis is that universal principle(s) 




it does not necessarily require universal recognition. For instance, discrimination based 
on ethnic prejudices is one subject of philosophical or more specifically “moral” 
universalism, which applies to all humanity even without universal recognition. While 
many reject racism, some espouse it. In the case of natural law, given its particularity in 
origin, one can argue that it is a different matter whether the people outside western 
tradition recognize natural law as the dominant principle inherent to their local practices. 
In this case, the authenticity of universal natural law relies on the notion of applicability 
rather than recognition. Therefore, respecting universally applicable moral tradition of 
others is distinct from recognizing or even ratifying it. But this does not mean that there 
are no universally recognized principles. There seem to be, though only minimally, some 
widely shared principles or values regardless of cultural differences, such as inviolable 
human dignity. The point is that moral universalism embraces two separate concepts on 
moral principles. Namely, there are moral principles that all mankind can properly be 
expected to respect, and universally recognized moral principles. In short, universal 
applicability and recognition are philosophically different concepts.   
 
1.1.2 Natural Law, Human Rights, and Western Moral Universalism. Despite this 
conceptual gap between universal applicability and recognition, there are people who 
believe that certain principles are universally applicable and at the same time recognized. 
The example is the universalist critics in the Asian values debate, detailed in Section 1.2. 
(I do not mean that every universalist falls in this category. Nor do I claim that 
universalist critics are the only people who persuade other people to prioritize their moral 
truth.) In the context of the Asian values debate, universalist critics consider that their 
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principles are universally significant, and are sharply contrasted to particular local 
traditions. And the dichotomy between the universal and particular stance is where the 
Asian values debate begins.
27
  
Despite the possibility of there being many universally applicable moral systems 
in the world, the ideas of natural law (based on the rationality of human beings) and 
human rights (the rights of human beings) are probably the most dominant and well-
known moral universalisms. For example, Henry S. Richardson reserves the label “moral 
universalism” for Thomas Aquinas‟s idea of natural law and Aquinas‟ “determination of 
certain generalities” in particular. By equating “moral universalism” with natural law, 
Richardson implies that natural law is the only universal moral system applicable to all. 
For Richardson, local or particular practices are a mere celebration of how particular 
each case is, not equally worthy as natural law of the title universal.
28
  Simply put, 
natural law is the fundamental principle on which local practices should be based. 
Therefore, it is possible for advocates of “moral universalism” to avoid direct tension 
with the adherents of different moral traditions by shifting their focal point from 
confrontation to assimilation with pluralities of claims.  
However, Richardson discounts the possibility of there being universal principles 
in non-western traditions or in other western traditions. Moreover, he ignores the point 
that man‟s rationality is just one aspect of the vast array of human faculties, which in turn 
                                                          
27. My thesis looks at the debate on moral universalism and cultural particularism as the 
discussion that goes beyond philosophical concepts per se: both universalist and particularist 
parties present their opinions about universal morality (in case of the Asian values debate, it is 
human rights principles) and debate over how they are applicable to and ratified by locals.  
28. Richardson, “Introduction.”  In the debate on Asian values, universal morality is the idea of 
human rights, a counter principle of Asian relativism. See Bruun and Jacobsen, “Introduction.”  
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questions the reliability of natural law as an ultimate universal morality. Indeed, the 
assertion of universal morality, such as the claim for natural law or human rights, are 
evidenced by human rationality, over-generalized human endowments. On this score, the 
idea of human rights is a culture constructed by magnifying rationality as equivalent to 
human nature.
29
   
The principles of human rights form another case that standardizes the meaning 
of moral universalism as a part of the western tradition. Scholars argue that human rights 
are universal not only because they have been codified as universal in the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, but also and more importantly because “human rights are 
necessarily universal”.30 As being human is the only condition of the legal subject and 
holder of rights, respect for human rights means that we should not discriminate 
arbitrarily between people according to their nationality, gender, ethnicity, or other 
identities. Some claim that the principles of human rights are not exactly a heritage of 
western culture but rather a self-standing concept created in the post-war period to rule 
out human atrocities. Others argue that the concept of rights itself is particular to the 
western tradition in the sense that human rights are different from the idea of human 
dignity, a common teaching of eastern philosophers.
31
 Yet for those who are confident 
that human rights principles are more basic than and have priority over other principles 
(in case of the Asian values debate, I call them universalist critics) the impeccable 
logic—human rights are possessed by all humans and should therefore be universally 
                                                          
29. Dallmayr, “„Asian values‟ and Global Human Rights.” 
30. Chan, “Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights,” 28; italics added. 
31 . For the former‟s stance, see Svensson, “Chinese Debate on Asian Values and Human 
Rights.” For the latter, see Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values.” 
22 
 
recognized—retains as a crux of the principles of human rights. Given this irrevocable 
reason and the motive of securing basic life conditions, those people are convinced that it 
is right to demand the universal recognition of human rights even to people with different 
notions of the human good. In sum, many scholars identify “moral universalism” solely 
with natural law and human rights. The following sections focus on those who not only 
make this identification but in addition insist that everyone recognize its truth. To 
distinguish the latter from other universalists, I name it western moral universalism to 
signify a universalist belief that natural law or human rights should be universally 
recognized when considered applicable to all people.
32
   
 
1.1.3 Moral Universalisms: Plural Forms of Universal Morality. There is an increasingly 
noticeable gap between scholars, such as Richardson, who see moral universalism as a 
product of western standards, and philosophers, including Amartya Sen and Michael 
Walzer, who think that universal morality can take different forms. From the latter‟s 
point of view, moral universalism is not a monopoly of western language. For instance, 
Buddhism too can embody a universal morality. As with human rights or natural law, 
Buddhism embraces all humans in its teaching. The concept of dharma or eternal cosmic 
law works for the greater good and strives to mitigate the caprices of the cosmos. This 
notion is vital to human nature and shared by all “creatures with consciousnesses”.33 This 
                                                          
32. I am aware that moral universalism or universalists does not always belong to the “West”. 
And natural law and human rights are just two examples of other western traditions. However, in 
the context of human rights and natural law traditions, I use the term “western”.   
33. Nosco, “Buddhism and the Globalization of Ethics,” 77. 
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sense of sharing a commonality enables Buddhists to render compassion to the sufferer, 
that is, the former can empathize with the latter‟s agony as part of its own: 
 
Because of the integration of ourselves into the morally governed 
harmonic of the cosmos, we find that it is impossible to separate our own 





In addition to this grand principle of compassion, Buddhism‟s understanding of the 
changing nature of things, life as sorrow and suffering, or the self as a non-permanent 
being, have as much claim as western tradition of human rights and natural law to 
general applicability. As Nosco observes, Buddhist morality, which is particular but at 
the same time compatible with other moral traditions, is “the dynamic interplay between 
universalizing traditions and local particularism.”35 From this standpoint it can be derived 
that all traditions have particular origins and can potentially develop universal claims. 
The content of people‟s moral claims depends on their historical experience and can be 
both particular and universal. Before proceeding to the chapter on Shinto, the next 
section identifies problems with western moral universalism through the review of the 
Asian values debate.  
 
 
                                                          
34. Ibid., 78. 
35. Ibid., 87. 
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1.2  The Asian Values Debate 
This section attempts to elucidate two problems relating to the tension between moral 
universalism and cultural particularism: 1) the narrow stance of universalism as western 
tradition and particularism as non-western traditions, and 2) one recognizes other 
people‟s “universal morality” as the outcome of persuasion. 
 
1.2.1 Overview of the Asian Values Debate. The epitome of the dispute on western moral 
universalism is the so-called Asian values debate which pitted those who argue in favour 
of the universal applicability of human rights principles and advocates of “Asian” 
particularity who challenge the former‟s absolute principles.36 The Asian values debate 
was once ablaze with the self-confidence of some Asian traditionalists during times of 
economic success yet diminished during the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s. 
However, it still remains relevant in the context of the rhetoric of “war on terror” under 
which the advocates of Asian values again disrespect political human rights.
37
  
The term Asian values is confusing since it does not refer to the archetypical values 
of the entire Asian population. As many agree, “Asian values” is a cultural stance 
claimed by some Asian political leaders, notably Suharto of 
Indonesia, Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore.  
                                                          
36. Throughout the thesis, I employ the term Asian traditionalists to refer to advocates of Asian 
values, and universalist critics to western critics of Asian value. Many western critics of Asian 
values are motivated by their belief in universal principles of human rights. Most of them refute 
Asian values from the standpoint of western moral universalism. An example is Donnelly‟s 
“defence of western universalism” in his “Human Rights and Asian Values”. Therefore, 
“universalist” in this context may be confused but still relevant to universalism of a meta-theory. 
37. Avonius and Kingsbury, “Introduction.” 
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Apart from these leaders‟ published remarks, the Bangkok Declaration of 1993 
(hereafter the Declaration) is usually considered to best represent the objective of “Asian 
values”, namely to reject a static interpretation of human rights imposed especially by 
powerful western states. As Section 5 of the Declaration states:   
  
Emphasize the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and 




The Declaration even suggests integrating “the Right to Development” into universal 
human rights; it sheds light on non-West‟s claim for their own universal morality. 
Succinctly summarized, Section 8 of the Declaration expresses the position of the 
avowal: 
 
Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of 
international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds.
39
       
 
                                                          
38. Italics are original. Kymlicka and Sullivan, Globalization of Ethics, 264-265. 
39. Ibid., 265. 
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This message accepts the universal significance of human rights, while stressing that the 
way it is recognized inevitably varies according to local understandings for respect of 
ethical pluralism. In fact, some scholars read the Declaration not as objecting to the 
universal applicability of the human right principles, but as rejecting efforts by western 
states “to pressure other nations to conform to western interpretations” of such universal 
principles.
40
 Others, however, perceive Section 8 together with “Asian values” not only 
as a self-contradictory statement but also as a challenge to the invariant imperatives of 
human rights from the viewpoint of cultural relativism.
41
 Therefore, the Asian values 
debate is usually taken as a confrontation between moral universalism and cultural 
particularism.  
It can be said that two main factors firmly set the course of direct confrontation 
between universalist critics and the proponents of “Asian values”: 1) Asian traditionalists 
themselves cemented the stance of being a challenger to western moral universalism,
42
 2) 
Asian traditionalists who support the Declaration are likely to use “Asian values” as a 
pretext for infringing the human rights of their citizens, which in turn invites criticism of 
“Asian values”.43 Firstly, Lee Kuan Yew‟s denunciation of western individualism in 
defence of Asia‟s communitarian values polarizes Asian and western cultures. Lee‟s 
point is that obsession with individual rights in the U.S. lead to “the breakdown of civil 
society”, whilst the principle of social harmony in East Asian countries provide a well-
                                                          
40. Sullivan, “Ethical Universalism and Particularism,” 201. A similar view is held by Chan in 
“Asian Values and Human Rights,” 28. 
41. For example, Bruun and Jacobsen in “Introduction” (2), describe the Bangkok Declaration as 
“problematizing the universality of human rights”.   
42. Svensson, “Chinese Debate on Asian Values and Human Rights,” 204. 
43. Bauer and Bell, “Introduction,” 12. 
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ordered society under which individual freedom is maximized.
44
 Because Singapore is 
the leading state to embrace and advertise Asian distinctiveness, the actual content of 
“Asian values” is identified with a part of Singaporean moral tradition, namely 
Confucianism.
45
 While ignoring all elements compatible with universal human rights, 
“Asian values” highlights its differences with the concept of individual rights: social 
harmony is strengthened through the conduct of sophisticated, moral elites and individual 
self-restriction is for the sake of communal harmony, not the oppression of individual 
rights from the above. In fact, it is considered rational because it eventually increases 
individual freedom.  
 Secondly, the “Asian values” perspective on human rights troubles universalist 
critics. For example, Kishore Mahbubani denounces Myanmar in order to distinguish 
Singaporean leaders from notorious authoritarian rulers. However, western human rights 
advocates still consider the penal codes of Singapore as unnecessarily strict according to 
their humanitarian standard.
46
  Therefore, what irritates these critics about “Asian values” 
is that the Confucian interpretation of universal human rights with emphasis on state 
sovereignty can give some authoritarian states a pretext for committing domestic human 
rights abuses. 
 In sum, both universalist critics of “Asian values” and Asian traditionalists assert 
their moral excellence. On the one hand, Asian traditionalists boast about how well 
                                                          
44. Ibid., 6. Also in David Kelly, “Freedom as an Asian Value,” 182.  
45. Svensson in “Chinese Debate on Asian Values and Human Rights” (209) argues that China, 
for example, is careful not to use the rhetoric of “Asian values” when confronting human rights 
discussions. 
46. See also Svensson “Chinese Debate on Asian Values and Human Rights,” 202. 
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Confucian oriented communitarian society attains the human good, in contrast to egoistic 
western societies where people are obsessed with individual rights. On the other, 
universalist critics argue that “Asian values” embrace the rationale to legitimize 
undemocratic polices which endangers citizens‟ human rights. Therefore, “Asian values” 
is totally unacceptable when it is used as a mask of human rights abuses. In this way, the 
cultural differences that appeared in the understanding of human rights were mistakenly 
underlined both by Asian traditionalists themselves and by the critics of Asia‟s human 
rights record. Highlighting the aspect that the Bangkok Declaration reiterates the 
appreciation of the universal applicability of the human rights principle, this thesis 
reconsiders the way one recognizes other‟s notions of morality. 
 
1.2.2 Universalist Responses. The response from universalist critics to the proponents of 
“Asian values” is mainly twofold and defends the universal applicability and recognition 
of human rights. First, some critics deny the East/ West dichotomy altogether. Moreover, 
they assert that “Asian values” is rather a type of political propaganda espousing national 
identity by challenging westernization. In this view, it is inappropriate to emphasize 
East/West cultural differences via stereotyped prejudices, namely East Asia as the region 
of authoritarianism legitimized by Confucian philosophy and the West as a champion of 
human rights and democracy.  
According to Edward Friedman, the perception of the “West” is a recent 
invention as evidenced by, for example, the notion of Anglo-Saxon unity. Such unity 
under the premise of democracy and human rights is rather new when one considers, for 
instance, the American War of Independence against the British or the constant disputes 
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between Anglicans and Irish Catholics, continuing to the present day.
 47
 The term West 
was popularly used in the Cold War rhetoric when “West” was identified with 
democracy, accompanied by the contrary image of the “East”, such as non-democratic 
and authoritarian rules. Yet without the East/West dichotomy, Friedman points out that 
people have many things in common. Today‟s Anglo-American democracy is the 
accomplishment—imperfect as it may seem—of the long struggle against inhumane 
practices, which in turn reveals little difference with Asia‟s ongoing but rapidly 
spreading human rights consciousness.
48
 Moreover, it can be said that the “East” has 
historically embraced concerns for the human good throughout history, such as non-
violent resistance in India or Japan‟s Taisho Democracy which objected to European 
racism. Therefore, “when East and West are properly compared, much of the supposed 
cultural distinctiveness of one or the other swiftly disappears”.49   
 In the same vein, reducing Asia‟s complex cultural heritage to “Asian values” is 
dubious because Asia is not only too dynamic and too multi-faceted but also fragmented 
by regional, ethnic and individual dissimilarities. Hence, it is improper for Asian 
traditionalists to determine the nature of “Asian values” by contrasting them with the 
“West”.50 “Asian values” is a political discourse employed by leaders to shape chaos into 
order by forging national identities. As Friedman argues, the idea of “Asian values” is 
generally acceptable for Malaysians, who may otherwise fall apart into two major camps, 
                                                          
47. Friedman, “Since There Is No East and There Is No West, How Could Either Be the Best?” 
48. Friedman, “Asia as a Front of Universal Human Rights.”  
49. Friedman, “Since There Is No East and There Is No West, How Could Either Be the Best?” 
22. 
50. Bruun and Jacobsen, “Introduction.” 
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Muslims and Confucians. For Singapore, the idea of “Asian values” serves as both 1) a 
substitute for a national identity that has not yet been created
51
 and 2) a defence 
mechanism against westernization for an otherwise young and multi-cultural state.
52
  
 In sum, the first camp of universalist critic argues that the idea of “Asian values” 
is mere political propaganda. However, one cannot deny the impact and the tradition of 
“Asian values” itself. Even if one holds that practices under “Asian values” are morally 
wrong, it still is a moral tradition of some.
53
 One can then point out that the Asian values 
debate does not evolve through mutual respect but is simply a judgement of one 
another‟s tradition from one‟s own standard. In this sense, it can be argued that it is a 
misguided approach to the Asian values debate to ask whether the claims of universalism 
or of “Asian values” are more compelling.  
 The second type of critical response does not aim to disprove “Asian values”, but 
assesses the local compatibility of universal human rights principles. It sets a clear view 
on what is acceptable and unacceptable about the Asian perspective on human rights. For 
Joseph Chan, it is unacceptable for Asian traditionalists to negate the principles of human 
rights per se at the expense of economic development and political stability, although the 
“scope, weight, and ranking of rights” can be arranged in Asian ways.54 This is because 
the principles of human rights are not only fundamental but also beneficial to every 
individual. As Jack Donnelly argues, even if the concept of rights is new to Asians, 
human rights serve “to protect individuals and families against the power of ever more 
                                                          
51. Friedman, “Asia as a Front of Universal Human Rights,” 58. 
52. Chan, “Asian Values and Human Rights,” 35-36.  
53. Ibid., 35. 
54. Chan, “Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights,” 32. 
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intrusive states and the gruelling indignities of free market capitalism”.55  With local 
traditions that concern human dignity, Asians are certainly unfamiliar with rights-
thinking in western tradition. However, because the principles of human rights protect 
individuals from abuse, it is not surprising that there are Asian ways of interpreting 
universal human rights. Simply put, the best compromise offered from the second camp 
of universalist critic is the invariant recognition of universal human rights yet local 
variation in its interpretation.
56
 As the recognition of the universal relevance of human 
rights is a firm assumption, local traditions “must give way” when confronted. 57 
Otherwise, the locals ought to seek a balance between civil/political and social/economic 
rights in its fulfilment. Although the critics admit the existence of local interpretations of 
human rights principles, they are adamant in their grand assumption: it is ultimately 
important to recognize the universal applicability of human rights. In a nutshell, the 
second type of universalist critic perceives that the principles of human rights are 
unconditionally applicable even obligatory to anyone without universal recognition.   
 
1.2.3 The Problems of Universalism. Examining the voices raised at the Bangkok 
Declaration of 1993, namely non-western states‟ objection to the imposition of western 
understanding of human rights, one may wonder whether it could have led to a more 
global cross-cultural dialogue. Instead, the Declaration triggered an East/West 
                                                          
55. Bauer and Bell, “Introduction,” 7. 
56. The notion of natural laws‟ variable content has been debated in the West for decades. Rudolf 
Stammler in Theory of Justice, for instance, argues that the universal view of law undergoes 
“change and progress” and that there are “many differences of opinion concerning the absolutely 
valid method of just legal content”.   
57. Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values,” 83. 
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confrontation. What the Asian values debate left for us is the repulse of each other‟s 
tradition, particular or universal. The way that Asian traditionalists defended 
communitarian values sounded rather offensive to the West, while some universalist 
critics interpreted the idea of “Asian values” as mere political propaganda. The assertion 
of one‟s tradition and negation of the other seemingly exacerbated the debate.  
 However, as the second type of universalist critic points out, a more constructive 
approach to the Asian values debate would require each side not to caricature each 
other‟s traditions but seek to understand what each morality might require when it is 
related to all persons. This is the difference between the first and second camp of the 
universalist standpoint. The first group of critics reveals the nature of the universalist 
stance and “Asian values”, while the second group focuses on how to bridge the 
disagreement between universalist critics and Asian traditionalists. As Chan argues, by 
engaging in critical assessment of “Asian values” per se, many discussants misplace the 
focus of the real issue, namely how to settle the Debate.
58
  For the second group of 
universalists critic, such settlement is materialized by universalists‟ tolerance toward 
local varieties in the recognition of human rights.  
Nonetheless, the second group‟s claim, namely a compromise between 
universalist critics and Asian traditionalists, is based on fixed identities, namely western 
moral universalism and local particularism; the former‟s universal morality is applicable 
to all humanity, therefore, no other local stances have room to challenge it. As Chan 
argues, therefore, the crux of the debate is how to balance the universalist and 
particularist standpoints given that the latter should not have effect on the former‟s “basic 
                                                          
58. Chan, “Asian Values and Human Rights,” 28. 
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understanding and content of universal human rights”.59 As already mentioned in the 
previous subsection, therefore, the second type of universalist critic confuses two 
different concepts, universal applicability and recognition. They assert that human rights 
principles should be not only respected but also recognized by all.  
Yet in a world of ethical diversity, there might be many other universal moralities 
that are equally important. In fact, by setting a dichotomy between western moral 
universalism and cultural particularism, the second group of critics ignores the existence 
of other universal moralities. So questions arise. Is dichotomizing western moral 
universalism and local particularism the right way to start? When universal human rights 
gain legitimate acknowledgement on the grounds of universal applicability, how about 
other universal moralities when they too are universally applicable but yet not 
recognized?  
By critically assessing the compromise proposed by universalist critics of the 
second type, I am neither defending authoritarian rulers when they oppress the people 
against the popular will, nor arguing against human rights principles per se. My aim is to 
draw attention to 1) the possibility that there might be universally applicable moralities 
other than human rights, and 2) the difficulty of understanding or recognizing other 
people‟s moral traditions, as illustrated by the Asian values debate.  These are the areas 
that the thesis aims to explore. To this end, it sets two objectives. The first objective is to 
reconsider the meaning of universal and particular, the very starting point of the 
dichotomous argument. The second is to understand what it means to recognize moral 
traditions other than one‟s own. 
                                                          
59. Chan, “Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights,” 26. 
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1.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began by shedding light on the meaning of moral universalism; a belief that 
a certain morality, though locally invented, is universally applicable to people across 
traditions. Given that what one tradition regards as universally applicable morality is not 
always practiced in another, a putative universal morality would not necessarily be 
recognized by all the people on the globe. It can be said that universal applicable 
morality remains as a local community‟s self-asserting moral universalism. Nevertheless, 
there might be a universally recognized morality; namely a certain universal morality is 
shared by all of humanity. Therefore, we can distinguish a local community‟s self-
asserting moral universalism from a consensus-based universal morality achieved by the 
adherents of different traditions. This distinction, in turn, elucidates that when a morality 
is applicable to all humanity, it is nonetheless “universal” even without universal 
recognition (e.g. natural law and human rights). In other words, a universally applicable 
morality is different from or does not necessarily require the universal recognition of the 
morality. 
Nevertheless, some universalists plausibly demand universal recognition from all 
people on the grounds of universal applicability in their morality. As Subsection 1.1.2 
discussed, the confusion of universal applicability and recognition was typically seen in 
those who believe in the absoluteness of natural law and/or human rights (I called their 
belief western moral universalism). The rationality of human beings and the rights of 
man are both universal character and privilege of all humanity; therefore, these 
universalists jump to the conclusion that locals have an obligation to employ them as 
foremost principles before others. In fact, scholars such as Richardson undoubtedly use 
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the terms universal morality and moral universalism in direct reference to natural law or 
human rights. However, as shown in the case of Buddhism in 1.1.3, there is a possibility 
that there are many universal moralities across traditions. Therefore, a theoretical gap lies 
between western moral universalism and the plurality of universal moralities.  
 The objective of the section on the Asian values debate was to illustrate the 
tension between moral universalism and cultural particularism in order to disclose two 
problems, namely: 1) the narrow stance of universalism as a western tradition and 
particularism as non-western traditions, and 2) the way of recognizing other universal 
moralities different from one‟s own. To this end, 1.2.1 examined the Asian values debate, 
which features some Asian traditionalists‟ reaction against the universalist claim for 
static recognition of human rights principles. Subsection 1.2.2 discussed two types of 
universalist analysis in the Asian values debate. The first rejects “Asian values” because 
it lacks credibility as either an interpretation of Confucianism or Asia‟s general moral 
culture. “Asian values”, apart from being a mere political pretext to justify inhumane 
state practices, could be a substitute of national identities for some Asian traditionalists in 
order to unite diverse cultures within their borders as well as to curb the erosion of their 
traditional values in globalization. This type of universalist critic analyzes the 
generalization of East and West and treats the appeal to “Asian values” as staking a claim 
without substance. The second type of universalist critic does not reject existing moral 
traditions, even if they are unfamiliar. But it tries to find a way for locals to interpret 
universal human rights, which are the supreme principles to all mankind.  
 The Asian values debate thus raises the question of the degree to which universal 
human rights should be recognized in particular traditions, including, one might note, 
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various western traditions. The point of the second camp of universalist critic is that it is 
necessary for all to recognize the universal application of human rights, though its 
interpretation can vary within limits according to local customs. Certainly, a reasonable 
settlement of the debate could only be reached if Asian traditionalists agreed on this point. 
The reality is, nonetheless, that the Asian values debate still persists.  
As Subsection 1.2.3 argued, the second camp of universalist critic presupposes 
that human rights principles constitute the utmost universal morality across traditions. 
The foremost reason for recognizing human rights principles is that they are universally 
applicable as the privilege of all mankind. By doing so, the second camp of universalist 
critic are confusing universal applicability with universal recognition of morality. 
Moreover, their claim excludes the possibility of other universal moralities than human 
rights principles. Therefore, one can say that misunderstanding another‟s tradition is one 
cause of the tension that persists in the Asian values debate. And Section 1.2 exemplified 
universalist critics and Asian traditionalists to show how each advocates asserted their 
moral truth before understanding one another.  
 In summary, through the review of the Asian values debate, the chapter clarified 
points for the reassessment: 1) a fixed stance between western tradition as universal and 
other traditions as particular, and 2) how to recognize someone else‟s universal morality. 
As an empirical grounding for the argument, the next chapter introduces Shinto morality. 
Shinto has two contributions to the argument. One is that Shinto, despite its local specific 
appearance, embraces universal morality in the sense that its morality can be understood 
and even respected by non-Japanese. Finding universal morality in a particular Shinto 
tradition, the thesis argues against the dichotomy between moral universalism and 
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cultural particularism. The other is that Shinto morality endorses universality but does 
not require universal recognition; it is about how far one can achieve high morality in 
one‟s way.  Shinto—holding universal elements without being universalist—further 
promotes the alternative mode of cultural association, voluntary recognition (to be 





















Chapter 2   Shinto as a Japanese Tradition 
 
2.1 Japanese Tradition 
This section aims to delineate the broad meaning of so-called Japanese tradition, both by 
examining “tradition” and circumventing confusion between Japanese tradition and 
Japanese national character. I examine one Japanese tradition, Shinto, in an effort to 
introduce it into the field of political philosophy.  
 
2.1.1 Defining Tradition. Tradition denotes customs or beliefs that are transmitted over 
the generations; it implies historical development and continuity.
60
 Traditional practices 
seldom continue without change from generation to generation. Although it participates 
in inherited practices, each generation adjusts them to the needs of present circumstances 
before passing them on to the next generation. So a tradition evolves over time, involving 
the inclusion and exclusion of social practices.  
What seems be old tradition is often a recent invention for some purpose.
61
  For 
example, Shinto is known as one of the oldest Japanese traditions, although it can be seen 
as a recently invented systematic religion, especially formed under the Meiji government. 
Certainly, it is important to remember that under certain historical conditions, the 
government may use “tradition” as a way to control people‟s thinking. In fact, the Meiji 
government‟s imposition of the Imperial Rescript on Education on the people subsumes 
the ethical concern of Tenno Meiji that purported to revive Japanese ethical tradition, 
                                                          
60. Pelican, Vindication of Tradition, 52. 
61. Hobsbawn, “Introduction.” 
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which had faded away with modernization.
 62
  It can be said that “tradition” is a historical 
continuation of beliefs or practices, often involving purposeful inventions.  
Nonetheless, it does not mean that tradition is only the continuing part of a social 
practice. What we comprehend as tradition comprises past experiences which even 
include beliefs or practices that the previous generation decided not to pass down to the 
posterity. Shinto‟s connection with militarism can be an example; the post-war Shintoists 
reject such connection as the mainstream of the current Shintoism. But excluded past 
practices (in this context, Shinto‟s role in militarism) have nevertheless exerted influence 
on the formation of the present tradition. In this sense, both continuing and discontinuing 
beliefs and practices have shaped the present tradition. To avoid confusion, I define 
tradition as what the present generation practices continuously from the previous 
generation. By past tradition I mean a ceased belief(s) and/or practice(s) from the 
viewpoint of the present generation. New tradition designates that the present generation 
has started a new practice by aiming to preserve it for the next generations.  
 
2.1.2 Japanese Tradition and the Japanese National Character. Influences from China and 
Europe, particularly Christian missionaries from Portugal in the Sixteenth Century, raised 
the islanders' consciousness of themselves as Japanese. Since then the Japanese have so 
often been compared with the non-Japanese that by the end of the Twentieth Century 
more than 2000 pieces of literature about Japan and the Japanese had been published 
                                                          
62. The term Tenno (literally celestial Kami) denotes the Japanese emperor. As opposed to for 
instance, the Roman or Chinese emperor, the Tenno, identified as a descendant of the Sun 
Goddess Amaterasu, represents the national symbol of Japan.  
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both inside and outside of Japan.
63
 For instance, Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum 
and the Sword is one of the major treatments of the traditional Japanese character as 
established by the caste system, social obligations, religions, and other social elements.
 64
 
Similarly, many claim that there is a unique Japanese character, part of which is that the 
Japanese dedicate their life to their kin group. The following discussion reviews Chie 




In Nakane‟s analysis, a distinctive feature of Japanese society is the hierarchical 
group formation under which everyone engages in a one-to-one vertical power 
relationship.
66
 The Japanese caste system is based on a group rather than on individuals, 
which is different from the Indian caste system that respects individuals in strata. Not 
only within a family but also in enterprises, an individual's devotion to a family-like 
business corporation enhances group solidarity. Besides, “once rank is established on the 
basis of seniority in Japan, it is applied to all circumstances”, whereas the Chinese 
seniority principle includes a possibility that “senior and junior might well stand on an 
equal footing in certain circumstances”.67 In other words, the seniority principle of Japan 
                                                          
63. Funabiki, “Nihonjinron” Saiko, 21. 
64. Hasegawa, Chrysanthemum and the Sword. 
65. I select Japanese Society (1970) and Bushido (1900) because both are basic reading material 
in Japanese studies. Nakane‟s Japanese Society was translated into thirteen languages and 
acclaimed as the best and long seller up to today. The author of Bushido, Nitobe (1862-1933), is 
considered to be a historical figure by many Japanese. He accomplished multiple tasks to 
promote Japan‟s modernization. His posts widely ranged from the agricultural advisor at the 
Japanese colonial government in Taiwan to Under Secretaries General of the League of Nations. 
Among his other publications, Bushido was written for western readers to introduce Japan‟s 
samurai culture, which became an internationally recognized book.  
66. Nakane, Japanese Society. 
67. Ibid., 29. 
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shows its particularity, though its idea was originally imported from the continent of 
Asia; the senior-junior relations in Japan are permanently hierarchical. By emphasizing 
the originality of the caste as well as the seniority system in Japanese society, Nakane 
claims that cultural homogeneity throughout Japanese history has helped to establish this 
Japanese uniqueness. However, she adds, the Japanese uniqueness is partly changing 
according to the needs of the time but will nevertheless keep the core of that unique 
cultural feature. The hierarchical structure can be seen throughout Japanese history and is 
very deeply rooted. For that reason, “in Japan, a group inevitably and eventually 
develops the vertical type of organizational structure at any time”.68  
The ethics of Samurai or Bushi are another focus of Japanese studies. In Inazo 
Nitobe's Bushido, the soul of Japan, Bushido is regarded as the unwritten code of the 
moral principle of the warrior class.
69
 In Bushido, benevolence is the highest requirement 
of traditional ethical thinking under which a bushi calms his mind with tenderness and 
feels pity in order to make fair judgments. Similarly one can express sympathy through 
benevolence that gives meaning to politeness, which is a social norm of Japanese society. 
As Nitobe describes it, the law of etiquette is based on benevolence. One takes off the hat 
when talking to an acquaintance passing by, for example. One sympathizes with the 
acquaintance under the strong sunlight so that one shares this discomfort by removing the 
hat.   
                                                          
68. Ibid., 63. 
69. A “bushi” is a knight and “do” stands for “the way of something” therefore “Bushido” means 
the precepts of knighthood. Nitobe, Bushido, the Soul of Japan.  
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While Nakane sees one‟s loyalty in hierarchy as a particular tradition of Japan, 
Nitobe argues that the duty of loyalty is a distinctive cultural feature of Japan, different 
from western individualism: 
  
The individualism of the West, which recognizes separate interests for 
father and son, husband and wife, necessarily brings into strong relief the 
duties owned by one to the other; but Bushido held that the interest of the 




In Bushido, self and other are considered to be one being through the bond of loyalty. 
Therefore a wife's subjugation to her husband and family as well as a man's self-sacrifice 
to his lord and country can be justified, which sharpens the difference with Anglo-Saxon 
individualism where individual rights are guaranteed.  
The ethical principles above and other traits of Bushido, such as Giri (social 
obligations), the culture of shame and honour, suicide and revenge, for Nitobe, now still 
play important roles in Japanese society: 
 
Bushido as an independent code of ethics may vanish but its power will 
not perish from the earth; its schools of martial prowess or civic honour 
may be demolished, but its light and its glory will long survive their 
ruins.
71
   
                                                          
70. Ibid., 88. 




 Relating to the definition of tradition, it can be said that Nitobe considers Bushido as a 
continuing social tradition. 
 However, those who are sceptical that there is a distinguishable Japanese 
national character that has been shaped by unique social practices challenge 
conventional views of Japan and the Japanese. As Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto 
point out, it is wrong to assume that the Japanese belong to one social group to which 
they show their loyalty; an individual belongs to more than one group at the same time. 
In other words, Japanese society is, like other societies, complex and diverse; a holistic 
view of the Japanese misses internal differences and the role of minority cultures.
72
 
Another point Sugimoto and Mouer criticize is the research methodology of Japanese 
Studies. Namely, the theory of unique Japanese group behaviour is often contrasted 
with western individualism. However, it lacks either a clear definition of so-called 
western society or thorough research into “individualism”.73 In the case of Bushido, 
Nitobe was a complete amateur in the field but relied solely on his personal 
knowledge.
74
 Hence the validity of an existing ethics in Bushido remains controversial.  
 Unscientific Japanese studies ignore both group loyalties oriented among non-
Japanese, and the aspects of individualism in Japan. According to Mouer and Sugimoto, 
there are also so-called organization men in the United States, whose attitude resembles 
                                                          
72. Mouer and Sugimoto, Nihonjinron no Houteishiki.  
73. Ibid., 69-70:163. 
74. Funabiki, “Nihonjinron” Saiko, 46. 
44 
 
group loyalty presented in the name of the “Japanese national character”.75 Furthermore, 
individualism could be stronger in Japan than that in other societies. For instance, there 
are many different Japanese words for individuals (i.e. watashi, boku, ore, and washi) 
that all stand for “I” in English. National sports, such as Sumo and judo are 
competitions between individuals. Many hobbies popular among Japanese have nothing 
to do with group unity, such as bonsai (gardening), calligraphy, shogi (Japanese chess). 
So it can be said that Japanese culture embraces elements of individualism.
76
  
Nevertheless, the uniqueness of Japanese traits and traditions are taught at 
universities, and introduced as social norms by mass media.
77
 According to Takeo 
Funabiki, belief in Japanese uniqueness has released national anxiety throughout 
history.
78
 Whether unscientific or not, uniqueness of “Japanese tradition” may explain 
why Japan lost the Second World War only to rise as an economic giant subsequently. 
Nitobe, for example, was a member of the pre-war elite thus involved in imperial 
expansionism and Japan‟s struggle to overtake western civilization. Therefore, Nitobe 
wrote Bushido for western readers to claim that its ethics are the equal of Christian 
ethics.
79
 Likewise, in the post-war period, theories such as Nakane‟s fulfilled the 
reader‟s demand to fathom the changing attitude of the Japanese after the war, as seen 
through the eyes of orientalism and ethnocentrism.
80
 
                                                          
75. Mouer and Sugimoto, Nihonjinron no Houteishiki, 212. 
76. Ibid., 200. 
77. Ibid., 119. 
78. Funabiki, “Nihonjinron” Saiko, 36. 
79. Ibid., 50:64. 
80. Ibid., 210-223. 
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 In sum, the conventional literature about Japan and the Japanese emphasizes 
Japan‟s unique traditions and cultural homogeneity while ignoring the diversities of 
social customs and strata within Japanese society. Yet many allegedly distinctive 
Japanese characteristics can be found in the practices of other societies.
81
 Nonetheless, 
non-academic claims regarding Japan‟s national character and its traditional customs 
have been popular partly because they offer a comfortable explanation of Japanese 
identity. 
 The Japanese studies discussed above blur the line between the concept of 
national character and tradition, which confuses the concept of “Japanese tradition”. 82 
Conventional Japanese studies seem to treat the society‟s tradition and the national 
character as an aspect of “Japaneseness”. Yet the critics have denied the existence of 
such stereotypical national character; fundamentally, it is impossible to tell a single 
national character because there are internal diversities and the presence of similar 
characters between people across societies.  
 The negation of a national character that originates from tradition should not 
mean that there is no such particularistic tradition in a society.
83
 Hence the particular 
traditions that all Japanese practice need to be discovered.
84
 As discussed earlier, one‟s 
                                                          
81. Mouer and Sugimoto, Nihonjinron no Houteishiki, 193-194:288. 
82. I define Japanese as those who exercise a Japanese way of life even outside of Japan. There 
are many communities that have been established by Japanese immigrants overseas. They do not 
reside in Japan but bring Japanese way of life, customs, culture, and any sort of tradition to the 
place they live. 
83. Mouer and Sugimoto, Nihonjinron no Houteishiki, 288. 
84. The intricate relationship between tradition and the rise of nationalism has been debated 
widely and can be dated back all the way to Europe‟s romantic period. Nationalism in Germany 
for example did not emerge naturally but was rather a by-product of the German people‟s 
resistance against the occupation of Napoleon‟s Grande Army in the early Nineteenth Century. In 
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loyalty performed under a hierarchical relationship comes with varying degrees of 
discipline and therefore depends on individual attitudes. Likewise, Bushido‟s ethical 
principles do not represent the ethics of all Japanese because it is set for men, which 
means the exclusion of women, who make up half the population.
85
  In short, the 
existence of a distinctive tradition in a community and the presence of the people‟s 
communal character are separate matters; there may be no unique national character of 
the Japanese people as a whole, but there may be Japanese traditions which the whole 
nation has inherited through successive generations. 
 
2.1.3 Shinto as a Japanese Tradition. Among various traditional practices in Japan, this 
thesis focuses on the Kami-cults (the ancestral religion of the Japanese), namely Shinto, 
given that Kami-cults already existed before Buddhism and other religions were imported. 
Moreover, Shinto is still practiced and is likely to endure. Japanese daily life is 
permeated with Shinto, such as the rites of passage, which are performed on one‟s 
turning point in life. As an example of the individual lifecycle and the rites of passage, 
pregnant women in the fifth month celebrate their fetus' growth at a shrine. One month 
after birth, the newborn baby visits a shrine to greet the Kami. On 15
th
 November, boys at 
the age of three and five, girls at the age of three and seven visit the shrine again to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
this case, the evolution of nationalism owes more to external factors than a sense of internal unity 
based on common traditions. 
85. According to Mouer and Sugimoto in Images of Japanese Society (15), exclusion of women 




celebrate their healthy growth in front of the Kami.
86
 Then in January, at the age of 
twenty, there is a national event to report to the Kami that they have become adults. 
There are other Shinto customs that apply when building a new house, purchasing a new 
car, and many other events, such as marriage and death. Even at home, traditionally the 
family members start daily life by praying for the Kami that are stationed in a small 
shrine in the house, called Kamidana.  
Although only 4% of the Japanese are said to embrace Shinto as a religion, most 
Japanese visit Shinto shrines on New Year‟s Day to pray to the Kami. 87  This 
contradiction can be understood when one conceives that Shinto is not only a religion in 
terms of one‟s faith but a set of customs that everyone consciously or unconsciously 
practice in daily life. Therefore, only a few Japanese may follow the religious aspect of 
Shinto, yet the majority take part in Shinto events as tradition. As mentioned in 
Introduction (p.13), Shinto has deep roots in Japanese society as a religion as well as a 
set of social customs. Not only does the Japanese yearly circle start and end with Shinto 
rituals but also tourists from abroad visit Shinto shrines and festivals, perceiving it as a 
Japanese unique culture so that Shinto practices continue through people‟s participation. 
In conclusion, I have argued that one may arrive at a stereotypical view on 
Japanese uniqueness, namely the group behaviour of the Japanese, by seeking a 
particular culture and tradition with Japanese society. However, that view is supported on 
patriotic grounds by domestic ethnocentrism and by pro-Japanese abroad. In respect to 
                                                          
86. Shrines‟ conduct of the rites of passage for children became a common practice only after the 
Taisho period of the early Twentieth Century. Breen and Teeuwen, New History of Shinto, 12. 
One may consider such rites as recent inventions, but I believe, others may think that it qualifies 
as a tradition because it has been kept for a century.  
87. Inoue, Shinto Nyumon, 2-3.  
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Japan‟s customary structures the concept of “Japaneseness” seems invalid, but Shinto has 
penetrated daily life of Japanese society. Therefore, Shinto constitutes Japan‟s most 
particular cultural and traditional legacy and this is why this thesis focuses on it. 
 
2.2 A Brief History of Shinto Morality 
To introduce Shinto morality, this section summarizes the history of Shinto morality.
 88
 
History shows variegation in Shinto, which suggests that the teaching of Shinto itself is 
not culturally particular to Japan. This supports the argument against a dichotomy 




2.2.1 From Ancient Times to the Post-War Period. As a Japanese ethnic religion, the 
foundation of what is now recognized as Shinto was already present in the form of Kami-
cults before Confucianism and Buddhism were imported in the Sixth Century. Kami- 
cults were a type of folk culture, yet not founded by a patriarch with a particular doctrine 
to spread certain teachings. Shinto was rather a communal practice centred on Matsuri 
(festivals)
90
 that encouraged a sense of social unity; an important element to the 
                                                          
88. Because many of Shinto‟s original scriptures can be found in the Chinese classics with 
distinctive terminologies, the research on Shinto relies heavily on secondary sources. In an effort 
to avoid selection bias, the sources will be collected from a wide range of scholars writing both in 
Japanese and English. Another validity problem may arise when translating Shinto terms from 
Japanese into English. For the sake of consistency, I borrow English translations of Shinto 
terminology from Kokugakuin University‟s Encyclopedia of Shinto and other English writers‟ 
translations. If no English translations are available, original Japanese words will be kept with 
English explanations. 
89. Given that Shinto is native to Japan “in terms of its landscape, its history, and its myths, and 
physical and cultural setting”, Ian Reader in Simple Guide to Shinto (23) concludes that Shinto 
has “no universalizing tendencies”. 
90. Matsuri is translated into festival in English as it often involves organized performances of 
music and plays as English denotes. However, the original idea of Matsuri comes from matsuru 
49 
 
community whose survival depended on the cultivation of rice fields. However, 
Buddhism was introduced from Korea as the religion that offered guardianship of the 
Tenno‟s realm in both material and spiritual ways. After power struggles between two 
clans of that time, the winning clan decided that Buddhism was not a threat but beneficial 
to Japan‟s religious and political culture through which the Japanese history of Buddhism 
began.  
Like the Buddha of Buddhism, Kami was respected as the guardian of human life 
as well as a guardian of the clans‟ prosperity. Therefore, Japan‟s indigenous cult required 
a proper status to distinguish itself from Buddhism whose religious role was similar to 
Kami‟s position. It is said that the people of that era called Kami-oriented folk culture the 
Kamunagara way. Kamu meant the Kami and nagara stood for letting it be,
91
 which 
indicated that the people followed what the Kami 
92
 offered them in everyday life. 
Through Matsuri, the core events of Kamunagara, the people worshipped their ancestors 
who were the ultimate source of their present life. Therefore, Kamunagara was not a 
systematic religion that preached morality or sought heaven after one‟s death as 
Christianity, but was the way of focusing on the people‟s continuous life from the past to 
the present.  As a counterpart of Buddhism, Kamunagara was now identified as 神 道 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(to worship the Kami), or matsu (to wait for the advent of the Kami), or matsurau (to obey or 
serve the Kami). Therefore, in Shinto‟s ethics, Matsuri together with rites indicates the 
presentation of worshipping the Kami. And this has been handed down over the generations as 
part of social customs and is likely to continue. In Japan, a year starts with Saitansai, a Matsuri 
of invocation for good health, and after two harvest Matsuri in Spring and Autumn, the year ends 
with Ooharae, a rite that shrines execute even today at the end of June and December in order to 
remove sin and pollution one bore in that year. Inoue, Zuaki Zatsugaku Shinto. 
91. Umeda, Shinto no Shisou (1), 14. 
92. Here the Kami means the Sun Goddess, the ancestor of the Tenno. 
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(Shinto), a term borrowed from the Chinese classics. The Chinese character of Japanese 
language identifies 神 as the Kami, and 道 represents the way.93 
  The main difference between the role of Buddhism and that of Shinto in Japan 
was that the former offered a set of teachings and morality where the latter did not have 
an ethical doctrine. Therefore, the people in Japan accepted Buddhist dogma because it 
covered Shinto‟s shortage of moral principles. However, because Shinto was the 
backbone of the national myth that legitimized the authority of the Imperial family, it still 
remained important. Therefore, people of that time accepted the Buddha as universal and 
superior yet in need of being protected by the local guardian, the Kami that enhanced its 
power in association with the Buddha.
94
 In the early stage of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism, 
this compromise penetrated into mass society through the promotion of the idea that the 
Kami also suffered pain and sought salvation from the Buddha.  
 From around the Ninth Century onwards, some Buddhists sought an explanation 
about the Kami which led to the establishment of the theory of Honjisuijaku. Namely, the 
Kami of Japan were manifestations of the Buddha of India that strives to save all living 
things, which endorsed the superiority of Buddhism. 
 However, under the national fear of the Mongolian invasion of the Thirteenth 
Century with the collapse of the domestic political system which destabilized the 
economy of shrines, Shintoists argued against the theory of Honjisuijaku in an effort to 
                                                          
93. The term Shinto first appeared in a Chinese scripture as an excel way or an ethereal method 
through which a saint rules over the land. See Umeda, Shinto no Shisou (1), 14. Further details 
about the original use of the word “Shinto” in Ono, Shinto, xi. 
94. Inoue, Zuaki Zatsugaku Shinto, 128. 
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reinvigorate indigenous Shinto as an alternative to Buddhism.
 95
 The Watarai house, the 
priests of Outer Shrine of Ise, claimed that the failure of the Mongolian invasion was 
caused by strong winds which proved that Japan was protected by the Kami of wind. 
Considering the Mongolian invasion as a national crisis, Priest Ieyuki Watarai (1256?-
1351?) thus urged the establishment of systematic Shinto, namely, Ise Shinto, through 
which he introduced the so-called Five books of Shinto (Shinto gobusho) that became the 
foundation of ethics in later Shinto Schools.
 96
 Each scripture focuses on different matters 
respectively such as the eternity of the Japanese nation, the Imperial Family, and Shrine. 
However, a common theme of Five books of Shinto is about the foundation of Shinto 
spirits, namely, honesty, purity, good behaviour, sincerity, and the belief of humans as 
children of the Kami. In other words, Ise Shinto offered moral standards in human 
conduct; every human being is the child of the Kami, therefore, one needs to keep one‟s 
honesty, purity, and sincerity and engage in good deeds, which can be enhanced through 
Shinto rituals such as Matsuri or purification (harae).
97
  
 Under the movement of anti-Honjisuijaku, Kanetomo Yoshida (1435-1511) of 
Yoshida Shinto, lamenting Buddhist domination over Shinto, espoused indigenous Shinto 
as superior to imported religions.
98
  As critics point out, both Ise and Yoshida Shinto, 
                                                          
95. Khubilai of the Mongolian Empire (1225-1294) dispatched the expedition to Japan twice, but 
the gale sank his navy and the invasion failed.  
96. Nakanishi, “Ise Shinto,” 429; Kuroda, “Chusei Shakai to Ise Shinko,” 264. 
97. As an example of the ritual of purification, the visitors of a shrine need to wash their hands 
with water to clean before praying for the Kami.  
98. Ito, “Yoshida Shinto”, 446. Taoism is “a Chinese philosophy based on the writings of Lao-
Tzu (including the Tao-te-Ching), advocating humility and religious piety”, while Onmyo is a 
Japanese elaboration of Taoism, including the augury based on yin-yang thought; cf. Oxford 
University Press, Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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despite their original outlook respectively, were still inspired by other traditions, such as 
esoteric Buddhism, Taoism, and Onmyo.
99
 Nonetheless, one cannot dismiss the 
contribution of both schools to the development of the moral aspect of Shinto, which is 
explored in the next section. 
 Although Buddhist influences on Shinto have been prominent since the Sixth 
Century, Confucian teachings also influence Shinto philosophy. Confucian ethics, which 
originated from Confucius (551-479), arrived in Japan before Buddhism (as recorded in 
Nihon Shoki), but its philosophical influence on Shinto are evident only much later.
100
 
For example, Yoshikawa Shinto of the Seventeenth Century took the moral importance of 
the hierarchical order from Confucian ethics. While Nobuyoshi Watarai (1615-1690) of 
post Ise Shinto sought to give new impulse to Ise Shinto by bringing in Confucian 
elements, Anzai Yamazaki (1618-1682) of Suika Shinto claimed the ethical foundation of 
Shinto in Confucian‟s master-servant relationship, which later became the foundation of 
the principle of public reverence for the Tenno. Put simply, the Confucian ethical 
teaching that one should venerate one‟s rulers and elders under the social hierarchy 
provided reasoned support for the Shinto practice of ancestor worship and furthered 
loyalty to the Tenno.
101
 
 In the fashion of foreign influence, especially Confucianism on Shinto, scholars 
such as Norinaga Motoori (1730-1801) and Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843), by seeking an 
authentic Japanese spirit, denied the influences of Buddhism and Confucianism on Shinto. 
                                                          
99. Maeda, “Shinto and Ancient Chinese Thought”; Yamada, Shinto Shisoushi, 58; Kuroda, “Ise 
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The result was the establishment of National Learning (Kokugaku) that focused on 
seeking pure Japanese spirits from old scriptures such as Kojiki or Nihon Shoki so as to 
find elements of genuine Japanese thinking as it existed before any influence from 
imported religions. Moreover, scholars such as Hirata, adding religious and ethnocentric 
dimensions to National Learning, established so-called Restorationist Shinto (Futtuko 
Shinto). Hirata‟s theory on Shinto was that originally there were Buddhist teachings in 
Shinto. Furthermore, influenced by western astronomy, Hirata asserted that the Japanese 
Kami that appear in Kojiki was the universal lord and created not only Japan but other 
countries too.
 102
 Because Hirata also emphasized the fusion of politics and the authority 
of the Tenno, his nationalistic idea fitted into a changing political climate from the later 
Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government which sought a restoration of the authority 
of the Tenno with the slogan, Keishin-Sonno (worshipping the Kami and revering the 
Tenno).  
 Worried that a tide of foreign cultures was submerging Japan, the Meiji 
Government of 1868 decided to penetrate the national consciousness of the masses using 
the principle of reverence for the Tenno. Shinto‟s claim for the Tenno as the descendant 
of the Kami played a significant role in legitimizing the authority of the Imperial family; 
therefore Shinto was now upgraded to the status of state religion, superior to all other 
religions. By searching for an institutional leadership of Japanese spiritual unity, the 
government authorized Shinto through the establishment of the Office of Divine Board 
(Shingiin) and placed Shinto under its surveillance. In the following year Tenno Meiji‟s 
Charter Oath confirmed that Shinto had become part of the institutions of government so 
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that religion and politics were fused. As a result, after approximately 1100 years the 
compromise of the Kami with the Buddha in Japanese religion was now over. The state 
protected major shrines and enacted a law that promoted a separation of the Kami from 
the Buddha. This separation resulted in either excluding Buddhist elements in Shinto or 
assimilating them into Shinto. The Meiji government, while officially approving freedom 
of religion, imposed the worship of shrines and the reverence for the Tenno in which 
Shinto was thought to be a state matter beyond religion.
103
 The intended effect of 
institutionalizing Shinto was to encourage the veneration of the Tenno as the Kami, the 
object of awe, which in turn encouraged nationalism and provided a justification for 
Japan‟s growing expansionism. Through worshipping war gods in Shinto shrines, the 
people surely raised their sense of unity and loyalty toward the Tenno and the nation 
during war time. 
 Losing the war in 1945 changed Shinto once again. Under the supervision of the 
General Headquarters (GHQ), the position of the Tenno shifted from the equivalent of 
the Kami to a mere constitutional figure. Japan‟s new constitution defined religious 
freedom and enacted the separation of politics and religion that meant Shinto had no 
governmental backup and was considered to be a personal religion. Nowadays, the 
Shinto described above is named Shrine Shinto, which is administered by a private 
institution, the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho), to which 99% of the 
shrines in Japan belong. In 1956, ten years after its establishment, the Association of 
Shinto Shrines released the Three Foundation Principles of Shinto thought, which will 
be explored in the next section.  
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 Apart from Shrine Shinto of the state religion, the Meiji government recognized 
thirteen denominations as Sectarian Shinto that had patriarchs and original doctrines. For 
instance, Tenrikyo, which developed under Miki Nakayama, who fell into trance and 
became the patriarch, preached the moral importance of cooperation, honesty, and loyalty. 
Even after the world wars, Sectarian Shinto increased the proliferation of its teachings 
respectably under the new constitution which guarantees freedom of religion. 
Nonetheless, the number of believers of Sectarian Shinto is quite small, while the rituals 
of an individual life cycle are organized by practices of Shinto Shrine. For this reason, it 
can be said that practices of Shrine Shinto constitutes the most common tradition of the 
Japanese. 
 
2.2.2 Outer Influences and Political Usage in the History of Shinto. Perhaps, the first note 
every student of Shinto studies makes, is that Shrine Shinto is the religion that has neither 
patriarch nor set doctrines.
104
 However, as this section has explored, there have been 
aspects of codified moral teachings based on Five books of Shinto, Kojiki, Nihon Shoki 
and other ancient scripts. Throughout Japanese history, Shintoists had repeatedly 
attempted to find or establish a distinguishable Japanese religion. Nonetheless, such 
attempt never materialized without the influence from other religions from the continent 
of Asia. As mentioned earlier, in Five books of Shinto, the concept of humans as children 
of the Kami, and its moral requirements (i.e. “spiritual purity” and “honesty”) were 
borrowed, influenced and shaped by teachings of other religions, such as Buddhism, 
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Confucianism, and Taoism. Together with Five books of Shinto, both Kojiki and Nihon 
Shoki have been the core texts of Shinto theologies from Ise Shinto of Thirteenth Century 
to Shrine Shinto of the post-war era. However, in the first chapter of Kojiki and Nihon 
Shoki, the cosmology of the beginning of the earth and heaven (on which the Kami(s) 
appeared) is said to be an adopted idea from Taoism, Lao-zi and Zhuangzi.
105
 In short, 
Shinto is a religion that has been shaped by and fused with other imported religions.  
 Another insight gained from history is that Shinto has been affected by the 
political necessities of the time. Shinto, though originally part of folk culture, was 
heralded as a Japanese religion in face of imported religions. Compiling Kojiki intended 
to “justify the rule of Yamato (i.e. ancient Japan)” and “to reconcile subordinate interest-
groups” by offering correct Japanese genealogies, myths and legends that distinguish the 
realm of Japan from foreign cultures.
106
 Similarly, Nihon Shoki refers to the Confucian 
concept of loyalty toward the Tenno that reflects the political value of that period, 
namely, the system of civil and penal codes. In fact, the early Eighth Century marked the 
period of the construction of Japan‟s centralized government, so the myths of Nihon 
Shoki showed the value of the Tenno‟s autocracy.107  
 The first theoretical Shinto, Ise Shinto, was said to have been necessarily 
established as a response to the changing political environment, such as the Mongolian 
invasion, the crisis in the economic management of the shrines, and anxiety about the 
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spread of Honjisuijaku among the masses. As the counter part to the dominant Buddhism, 
Ise Shinto offered three particular teachings of Shinto, namely, ancestor worship, one‟s 
internal perfection as the child of the Kami and the proper attitude at Shinto rituals.
108
 
Nonetheless, conveniently to the Watarai house, Five books of Shinto assert the equal 
footing of the Inner and the Outer Shrine. Therefore the scholars commonly agree that 
Ieyuki Watarai counterfeited the books in search of a higher status of the Outer Shrine he 
belonged to.
109
 In the same vein, Kanetomo Yoshida of Yoshida Shinto sought to 
subsume the popular cult of the Grand Shrines of Ise to his school. Yoshida Shinto also 
invented the idea that man could be Kami, thus two warriors, Hideyoshi Toyotomi and 
Ieyasu Tokugawa, were to be enshrined.
110
 As seen in the later development of Shinto, 
Shintoists were employed by the Meiji government in order to promote Shinto morality. 
Indeed Shinto was a part of Buddhism in the middle ages; however, it has become a 
representative religion of Japan through the effort of Confucian Shintoists in the Edo 
period and the propaganda of the Meiji government.
111
 In sum, this section focused on 
the history of Shinto‟s moral aspect. Shinto ideas are not simply about the Kami and 
rituals that have been passed on by the Japanese, but historically developed under the 
influence of other religions and political manoeuvres. The next section further examines 
the contents of Shinto‟s moral aspect.  
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2.3 Moral Aspects of Shinto  
As the title of my thesis indicates, examining Japanese tradition (i.e. Shinto) is one of the 
objectives of the thesis. This section aims to expose the contents of Shinto‟s moral 
tradition. Through an analysis of the current principles in Shinto, the section finds that 
certain key concepts are inherited ideas, such as virtue of being pure, bright and sincere, 
and Shinto‟s idea of cooperation and co-existence at both local and international level. 
The section explains and corroborates these concepts which link them to the second 
question of my thesis: how to recognize universal moralities other than one’s own?   
 
2.3.1 Methodological Issues. Shinto is a religion that does not compile “sacred texts that 
constitute the core focus of teaching”.112 Instead of a codified moral law of Shinto, the 
Japanese have practiced morality through customs, such as festivals, rituals, and praying 
for the Kami. Although there is no sacred scripture that represents Shinto‟s standard 
morality, a doctrinal aspect of Shinto has developed in different Shinto schools since the 
rise of Ise Shinto. Among various moral principles, my thesis attempts to justify a 
method that identifies traditional morality in Shinto. To illuminate traditional Shinto 
morality, one conceivable method could be to find a common moral viewpoint embraced 
by each school. This method, however, requires the comparison of all schools, including 
Shrine Shinto and Sectarian Shinto. Even if there is a commonality between all schools, 
there is no reason to regard it as present tradition because such a viewpoint may not be 
recognized by the current generation.  
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 An alternative method could then be to focus on one or two Shinto variants, such 
as Ise and Restorationist Shinto. However, even the philosophy of Ise Shinto that tried 
excluding the influence of imported religions cannot conceal the manipulation of 
Buddhism, Confucianism, and other religious thought.
113
 As mentioned earlier, Five 
books of Shinto which embrace moral codes of Ise Shinto are said to be conveniently 
amended in search of power by the Watarai Family. Restorationist Shinto, which 
incorporated Japanese indigenous thought, served as a tool of stimulating Japanese 
nationalism in the past. However, its moral claim is hardly recognized as an inherited 
social norm by the present generation. Indeed, the Three Foundation Principles 
announced by the Association of Shinto Shrines deliberately avoids any expressions 
reminiscent of the nationalism of Restorationist Shinto.
114
 Therefore regarding 
Restorationist Shinto‟s thought as the mainstream of Japanese tradition seems invalid 
today so it deviates from the theme of this thesis. In short, as the previous section 
concluded, the doctrinal aspect of Shinto is hardly indigenous but a mixture of local and 
foreign religious ideas, as well as a reflection of political needs. Therefore choosing one 
or two influential schools as indigenous Shinto ideas may not be the best method; it is 
difficult to identify original and purely Japanese ideas in Shinto. 
 Probably what is required here is rethinking the meaning of “indigenous”. In the 
sense of Shinto schools that were founded and developed by an exclusively Japanese way 
of thinking, no school can be called indigenous Shinto. However, we can speak of an 
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“indigenous” Japanese tradition if Shinto—even if it is a patchwork of other religions— 
continues from the past to the present Japanese generation.
115
 So the third option for the 
methodology could be to look at current Shinto morality as the consequence of what the 
past generation handed down to the present generation, and trace the origin of the present 
tradition back to history. Simply put, this method is to look at what appears now (i.e. the 
tradition of what the past generation brought into the present) and find old in it (i.e. what 
has been accepted from the past). One way of doing this could be to start from the Three 
Fundamental Principles (Keishin seikatsu no Koryo) and Shinto Edification (Shinto 
Kyoka) proposed by the Association of Shinto Shrines and to analyze their background 
and meanings. Hence this thesis will look first at what appears as the current tradition (i.e. 
Three Foundation Principles and Shinto Edification), and then trace the origin of these 
ideas. In search of tradition, Subsection 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 analyze sentence by 
sentence both The Principles and Edification to unearth the meaning of tradition, past 
tradition, and new tradition. 
 
2.3.2 The Idea of Internal Perfection and Worshipping the Kami. Announced at the tenth 
anniversary of the Association of Shinto Shrines in 1956, Three Foundation Principles 
(hereinafter The Principles), is the canon for an ideal of ethical life in Shinto. Whereas 
Shinto Edification is practical suggestions through which the Association of Shinto 
Shrines attempts to educate the public in the concept of Shinto morality. Shinto 
Edification idealizes: 1) enrichment of individual‟s character at home, 2) the individual 
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contributes to the good of local communities, and 3) the individual is concerned about 
the good of the nation-state and the international community (See Appendix for full 
contents of The Principle and Shinto Edification).
116
  
 Probably it is not easy to draw a sharp line between the role of The Principles and 
that of Shinto Edification. The former does not define the Shinto ethics but remains 
instead a vague summary of Shinto‟s moral teaching. The latter in contrast, is aimed at 
understanding and preserving Shinto morality in a way that makes practical suggestions 
based on Shinto‟s moral teaching. The Principles and Shinto Edification are similar, 
however, in that both take the position that Shinto morality should start with an effort to 
achieve internal perfection and then to consider one‟s neighbours and finally the people 
of the world as a whole. 
 As The Principles and Shinto Edification can be considered to be depictions of 
Japanese tradition that has continued from the past, this subsection delves into older 
Shinto terms.  
 
To express gratitude for divine favour and the benefits of ancestors, and 
with a bright, pure, sincere mind to devote ourselves to the shrine rites and 
festivals. (See Appendix) 
 
                                                          
116. The English translation of The Principle is original to Sokyo Ono, one of the founders of 
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The first principle of The Principles above can be divided into two independent ideas: 1) 
appreciation for the Kami and ancestors, and 2) one‟s service or attendance to Shinto 
rites and festivals with brightness, pureness, and sincerity. 
Keishin Suso. Gratitude to both the Kami and ancestors is called Keishin Suso, that is, 
worshipping the Kami and revering the ancestors.
117
 In Shinto, human beings are good in 
nature in the same way as the Kami, although man as living creature is not instantly equal 
to the Kami. Generally speaking, one can be a Kami only when one dies and the soul is 
afresh (the exception is the Tenno). Therefore, one‟s soul is eternal, and continues 
through festivals (Matsuri) in which the descendants recall their ancestors and worship 
the Kami. Recalling the memory of the ancestors through festivals was a part of Japanese 
folk culture, while worshipping the Kami was emphasized in Five books of Shinto. 
Therefore, Keishin Suso is the inherited concept from the previous generations.  
 Although the Association of Shinto Shrines carefully circumvents the idea of 
war-time nationalism with Keishin Suso, Akemitsu Asano‟s publication in 1943 affirmed 
that Keishin Suso with filial piety was one set of national ethics. Worshipping the soul of 
one‟s ancestor leads to the development of one‟s lineage as the smallest commune so as 
to prosper as the bigger community, namely, the nation state. Probably encouraged in the 
context of the world wars, Asano emphasized that Shinto served not individuals but the 
nation; individuals must act according to the purpose of national development.
 118
 As a 
matter of fact, Keishin Suso was used to bolster nationalism. As mentioned earlier (p.59), 
however, The Principles claim not to be the glorification of pre-war ideology; therefore, 
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it does not elaborate Keishin Suso to justify parochial nationalism. Hence it can be said 
that the mood of expansionism in Keishin Suso is past tradition in post-war Japan.  
Brightness, Pureness, and Sincerity. It can be said that “a bright, pure, sincere mind” is a 
set of key concepts in Shinto morality. A tricky word here is “bright”. Indeed, the direct 
translation from Chinese character (of Japanese language) is indisputably bright in 
English. However, its meaning certainly denotes more than the standard understandings 
of such as “full of light”, “strong and easy to see”, “intelligent”, “cheerful and lively”, or 
“hopeful”. 119  As a Shinto term, bright (mind) is contrasted to one‟s dark thoughts, 
therefore, the meaning of bright is closer to “clean” mind. 120 
 Five books of Shinto explain that “a bright, pure and sincere mind” is a person‟s 
fundamental mental status; the human body and soul are given by the Kami, therefore, 
humans should not corrupt themselves but keep their body and soul bright (i.e. clean) and 
hold high morality. In Shinto morality, all things in the universe are generated by the 
Kami spirit called Musubi (or Musuhi).
121
 Musubi is the very root of individual mind and 
body that cause every human action. Therefore, man is under divine providence of the 
Kami when praying for the Kami and refraining from having dark thoughts. Man should 
be careful not to lose pure heart the Kami gave once. For true worship of the Kami, one 
must cleanse not only body (through Kiyome, the act of purification) but also soul, that is, 
                                                          
119. Definitions from Oxford University Press, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 
120. The oracle of Tenno Suinin in Houkihongi (one of Five books of Shinto) states adversary 
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formulated under what influence. Given continental religions‟ influence on Shinto, it is no 
surprise that Musubi sounds familiar with other thoughts.  
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one does neither speak dirty words nor see dirty things.
122
 This is the ethics of pureness 
and brightness in Shinto. Simply put, “bright” in Shinto is used to signify man‟s 
disconnection with the dark side of human life. In other words, man should detach from 
unclean things, and keep his mind bright and pure, and worship the Kami with sincerity 
that means to believe the Kami stays right in front of him.   
 However, as seen in the first principle, the purpose of enlightening man‟s mental 
status is “to devote oneself to shrine rites and festivals”. And the vital role of Shinto rites 
and Matsuri are described in the source of Shinto theories, Kojiki, Nihon Shoki, and Five 




 The reasons why rites and Matsuri are important in Shinto can be found in 
Shinto‟s fundamental belief; immorality is only one‟s temporal mistakes that can be 
removed by the rites of purification. Shinto believes that human nature and the world is 
“inherently good”, or “pure and bright”.124 One‟s immoral actions are not one‟s true 
nature but artificial, hence easily removable through purification rites, such as Harai and 
Misogi (purification by bathing with water from the sea or river, or by sprinkling salt on 
the body). This line of thought was derived from Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, in which the 
performance of purification appeared in the story of a male deity, Izanagi, and his female 
partner, Izanami (these deities‟ task was to produce a Japanese land on the earth).  
Shinto‟s belief in the importance of purification rites and Matsuri are substantiated by its 
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theory of human nature and myth; pollution or uncleanness that one happens to bear in 
one‟s body and soul can be removed through the act of purification.  In theory, the role of 
rites and Matsuri is described in the records of ancient Japanese history; while in practice, 
they have enhanced the sense of communal unity, and establishing Japanese identity 
through the memory of the ancestors.125 
 While the purpose of internal perfection is dedicated to worshipping the Kami in 
The Principles, Shinto Edification stresses the establishment of one‟s peaceful and warm 
family settings. As the first note of Shinto Edification addresses: 
 
[O]n the domestic level, the promotion of Shinto-like character and 
development of peaceful and warm hearted homes. (See Appendix) 
 
The fundamental idea is the same as the first principle of the Principle, namely, one 
should be aware that one‟s body and soul were given by the Kami; therefore, one should 
worship the Kami through rites and festivals. However, “Shinto-like personality” in 
Shinto Edification stands for more than the meanings of “brightness, pureness, and 
sincerity”. According to Professor Naofusa Hirai of Kokugakuin University, it designates 
a person who appreciates a given life, hence respects life of oneself and other people‟s, 
making strenuous efforts to live every day, while seeking harmony with others without 
losing his own individuality.
126
 And the establishment of stable family life enhances this 
“Shinto-like personality” because Shinto rites are organized not only by shrines but also 
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within individual households. Shintoists consider family as the fundamental social unity 
for Shinto practice where the young members of the family learn from the elderly 
members about the custom of praying for the Kami at Kamidana. Thus the first point of 
Shinto Edification is the complement of a Shinto-like personality through a stable family 
that conducts Shinto customs. 
 “Pure, bright, and sincere mind” stated in The Principle can be considered to be 
tradition because it has been emphasized as the proper attitude of serving for the Kami 
since the rise of Ise Shinto. Meanwhile “Shinto-like personality” stated in Shinto 
Edification is a more elaborate version of the traditional Shinto personality. 
 
2.3.3 The Idea of Cooperation and Co-existence in a Community. 
 
To serve society and others and, in the realization of ourselves as divine 
messengers, to endeavour to improve and consolidate the world. (See 
Appendix) 
 
The second principle of The Principle indicates that a divine messenger must dedicate 
himself to society and expend effort to improve the world (i.e. consolidation). Man as a 
divine messenger of the Kami has been explained in the previous subsection; man is the 
child of the Kami so that man needs to strive for reaching a Kami-like mental status.  
 To understand the meaning of “improving and consolidating the world”, one 
should refer to the story in Kojiki which narrates the idea of consolidation of the world. 
According to myth in Kojiki, the deities needed to shape the land, which was originally 
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“resembling floating oil and a drift like a jellyfish”.127 In other words, the floating world 
had been transformed into a proper solid land by the deities. Therefore, according to 
Kenji Ueda, the story signifies the progress from chaos to orderly society or nation. As 
Shinto morality states, to “improve and consolidate the world” means man‟s effort or 
process to change chaos into stability.
128
  
 Compared to the first principle of The Principles which advocates one‟s internal 
perfection, the second principle indicates that one should work for one‟s environment. 
Similarly, the second point of Shinto Edification aims at three goals:  1) development of 
the local community, 2) co-existence and co-prosperity between the local people, and 3) 




[O]n the regional level, the coexistence and co-prosperity of the people is 
aimed at through the invigoration of local society and the protection of 
tutelary kami. (See Appendix) 
 
In Shinto, it is believed that each local community is under the protection of a particular 
Kami that advents to the place. Therefore, fostering both spiritual and material 
advancement can be promoted at the community level where the locals share the tutelary 
Kami. Co-existence and co-prosperity signify that the people must help each other to 
bring equal prosperity to all in the local area. And the shrines should encourage the local 
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people in achieving these aims through public rites and festivals, and lectures to enhance 
the sense of unity.
130
 
 It can be said that the importance of communal life is the idea behind the second 
notes in both The Principle and Shinto Edification. And moral significance of organized 
community life can be seen in Yengishiki, a codified law of the Tenth Century that 
enumerated eight sins (Amatsu tsumi) and fourteen sins (Kunitsu tsumi). While the latter 
is about sins committed between individuals, the former defined offences against 
harmonious communities, that is, the people‟s agricultural cooperation.131 It is said that 
in ancient Japan, according to the state civil and penal code of the centralized 
government, antisocial behaviour that disturbed orderly community was a crime; 
therefore, it was the subject of purification. (Later, the pollution of body and soul, and 
crimes were considered to be different issues.
132
) Although the present generation may 
not recognize Amatsu tsumi in daily life, the idea of cooperation and co-existence in a 
community can be said to have remained as a virtue in both The Principles and Shinto 
Edification.  
 
2.3.4 “World Culture” and Human Rights. 
 
To indentify our minds with the Emperor‟s mind and, in loving and being 
friendly with one another, to pray for the country‟ prosperity and for 
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peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity for the people of the world.  (See 
Appendix) 
 
In the third principle of The Principle above, the sentence, “to identify our minds with 
the Emperor‟s (i.e. the Tenno) mind”, may sound nationalistic. According to Ono, some 
claim that the Sun Goddess is the root of Shinto‟s symbol because the head shrine (the 
Grand Shrine of Ise) of the Association of Shinto Shrines is dedicated to the Sun 
Goddess. However, due to the warning from GHQ against the fusion of Shrine Shinto 
and politics, “the Emperor‟s mind” (securer after the war) was employed to The Principle 
instead.
133
 Similarly, the third point of Shinto Edification conveys the role of Shinto at 
national and international levels.  
 
[A]t the national and international social levels...the goal is the elevation 
of the spiritual life of the nation and the establishment of Japanese 
political and cultural identity. Also, Japan should act in a manner befitting 
it as a member of the world community in the areas of mutual assistance 
between nations, international cooperation and coexistence. (See 
Appendix) 
 
At the national level, the third code of Shinto Edification is aimed at improving the 
spiritual life of the people and establishing Japanese political and cultural identities 
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(including support for the imperial system).
134
 In other words, the protection of the 
national heritage and the preservation of traditional culture enrich the people‟s spiritual 
life. Ideally, Japan displays the distinctive identity through Shinto ideas as a member of 
international society so that uniqueness of Shinto constitutes an element of “world 
culture”: “a unique cultural character, combined with an international outlook, makes a 
significant contribution to the development of world culture.”135 
 Although Hirai does not clarify the meaning of “world culture”, he emphasizes 
the importance of peaceful co-existence and international cooperation especially through 
a spiritual perspective rather than by material fulfilment.
136
 Therefore, at the international 
level, Shinto‟s virtue includes Shinto‟s sympathy with the international norms that 
embrace trans-national issues, such as environment, natural resources, even development 
and human rights issues. To maintain spiritual richness in life, it is important “to be 
thrifty with resources and food; to protect those in need; to harmonize with nature by 
protecting the environment; and to promote peaceful coexistence by being materially 
frugal whilst being intellectually rich”. As a means to achieve these goals, Hirai suggests 
educating the adults.
137
 Therefore it can be argued that Shrine Shinto seeks the 
maintenance of a uniquely Shinto-oriented Japan. At the same time it endeavours to solve 
global problems. Although Hirai does not elaborate “the development of world culture”, 
it can be assumed that the outlook of such “world culture” is the gathering of different 
                                                          
134. Hirai, “Shinto Kyoka,” 446; Hirai, “Sengo 50nen niokeru Shinto Kyoka no Kaigan to 
Tenbou,” 524; Hirai, “Shinto Edification.” 
135. Hirai, “Shinto Edification.” 
136. Hirai, “Shinto Kyoka,” 446-447. 
137. Hirai, “Shinto Edification.” 
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national identities. Because the unique Shinto tradition of Japan is a part of “world 
culture”, distinctive traditions of other nation-states could be other parts that compose 
“world culture”. In brief, the focal point of Shinto Edification is peaceful co-existence 
through one‟s spiritual satisfaction. From Shinto perspective, therefore, communal 
practices of Shinto events indirectly contribute to the resolution of global problems.  
 The idea of peaceful co-existence with other nation-states seems to be a young 
tradition in Shinto Edification. Although the idea of cooperation and co-existence in a 
local community seems to have been tradition as the Yengishiki of the early Japanese law 
indicates, “the community” traditionally refers to villages, regions, and the Japanese 
nation at large. This is because when the Japanese myth describes heaven and earth, it 
indicates not universe in our sense but designates Japanese land solely.
138
  
 Contrary to the emphasis on co-existence in international society in the post war 
period of Shrine Shinto, military operation was justified under Shinto‟s logic during the 
wartime. According to Asano, the purpose of the Kami‟s creation of the world is the 
establishment of the world state on earth. It does not mean to homogenize the different 
people under one universal nation state, but implies the materialization of unity and of 
world culture under which different cultures and traditions are recognized. Therefore, 
waging war does not aim at commemorating massacre, plunder, nor destruction but to 
teach the idea of the Tenno‟s world state. If necessary, such “teaching” would be 
executed with force.
139
 Along with a pacifist line of the post-war Japan through its 
constitution, it can be said that violence justified by achieving the establishment of 
                                                          
138. Ueda, “Cosmology.”  
139. Asano, Shinto Shisou, 182:185. 
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“world culture” is now excluded from Shinto thought. Nevertheless, the idea of “world 
culture” itself has been kept in Shinto Edification.  
 The third note of Shinto Edification is about Shinto‟s search for its compatibility 
with international norms, such as those defining and prescribing respect for human rights. 
Indeed, the suggestion of the third point in Shinto Edification denotes that Shrine Shinto 
is concerned with a wide range of national and international issues. However, it can be 
said that the concept of human rights in the sense of political philosophy is never 
elucidated in Shinto morality. Kunitsu tsumi of Yengishiki states fourteen crimes that can 
be classified in five types: 1) injuring a person, 2) disease, 3) incest, 4) natural disasters, 
and 5) black magic, in which disease and natural disasters were regarded as sins because 
they were against the Kami‟s will.140  
 The ban on injuring and incest gives evidence for the existence of human rights 
concerns in ancient Japan. However, albinism, for example, was considered to be a sinful 
disease. As Noritsugu Muraoka points out, Amatsu tsumi and Kunitsu tsumi put sins 
committed by mankind and natural disasters altogether, which suggests that the ancient 
Japanese did not distinguish man‟s immoral actions from natural disasters.141 Therefore it 
is inappropriate to claim that the ancient law was established out of concern for the 
protection of human rights. In fact, torture was executed as a penalty of committing 
communal sins, Amatsu tsumi.
142
  
                                                          
140. Umeda, Shinto no Shisou, 54. 
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 In addition, as Ono explains, there is no invariable concept of good or bad in 
Shinto because moral judgments depend on the circumstance:  
 
[M]oral judgments as to what was considered to be good or bad were not a 
fixed system of standards, but varied considerably depending on each 
specific situation. The Shinto manner of grasping truth takes into 
consideration the fact that values are constantly changing. For example, in 





This is to say that the notion of good and bad is interchangeable according to the 
situation. In the Japanese myth, the brother deity of the Sun Goddess, Susanoo-no-mikoto, 
once committed immoral actions but turned to be a respectable deity. This parable tells 
us that nefarious actions can be reformed by good deeds. A Kami who may behave 
immorally can also behave morally. For that reason, even bad consequences arising in 
this world cannot be totally rejected because they came from man‟s good intention.144 
Without a fixed standard of good and bad, Shinto would hardly espouse human rights 
(that accord with a norm; securing rights as good vis-a-vis depriving rights as bad) as its 
tradition from the past. However, Shrine Shinto attempts to include it as a part of its 
edification; human rights concerns are becoming a new tradition in Shinto morality. 
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2.3.5 Section Summary: Tradition in Shinto Morality. Section 2.3 started with reviewing 
the post-war Shrine Shinto‟s Three Foundation Principles and Shinto Edification as the 
digest of Shinto tradition. Because The Principles are open for interpretation to avoid 
establishing rigid doctrines, my analysis would remain one with many interpretations of 
these codes. Despite this limitation, what the section has found is that there are elements 
of tradition, past tradition and new tradition in The Principles and Shinto Edification. 
 At individual level, tradition can be seen in the idea of Keishin Suso and the 
concept of “bright, pure and sincere mind”. The Japanese people have worshipped their 
ancestors and the Kami through festivals, whilst worshipping the Kami was an emphasis 
in Five books of Shinto. However, Keishin Suso as a justification for Japanese imperial 
expansion has become unacceptable in the post-war era. In fact, The Principles do not 
establish the connection between Keishin Suso and nationalism. Therefore it can be said 
that the interpretation for expansionism ceased to be part of the current tradition. One‟s 
“bright, pure, and sincere mind” has been man‟s fundamental posture as Ise Shinto 
highlighted it in Five books of Shinto. However, Shinto Edification adds an elaborated 
version of a person‟s character. Namely, the “Shinto-like personality” beholds an ideal 
personality of contemporary Shinto, which can be labelled a new tradition in Shinto 
morality.  
 At the local level, the importance of co-existence and cooperation in a community 
was already seen in the early law, Yengishiki of the Tenth Century, thus being tradition. 
However, the domain of community in Shinto tradition expanded to international society 
in The Principles and Shinto Edification with some modification. At the international 
level, instead of the Sun Goddess, the Japanese identity associates with the secular figure, 
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the Tenno, abide by the separation of religion and politics. After the Second World War, 
violence as a means to justify the Japanese empire ceased to be a part of the current 
Shinto morality. Despite such modification in Shinto tradition, the idea of “world 
culture” continues to be a key term among Shintoists. Although “world culture” has no 
clear definition, it is assumed to constitute the world loosely united through economic, 
political and cultural exchanges. Shinto‟s approaches to global cooperation and co-
existence posit that spiritual satisfaction is the very basis of humanity. Indeed, Shinto 
morality has been aimed at one‟s enlightenment that works to resolve global issues. 
Shinto‟s concern for cooperation in international society especially over poverty, 
development, and human rights may constitute a new Shinto virtue. Since there was no 
concept of human rights in Shinto theology, it would be a major shift in Shinto to 
incorporate the idea of human rights that has been outside the context of its tradition. 
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Today there are around 80,000 Shinto shrines all over Japan with 20,000 priests.
145
 
Shrine Shinto‟s lack of one united sacred scripture and a patriarch makes the Japanese 
less conscious of Shinto as a religion. Nonetheless, Shinto practices were inherited 
through rites and public festivals all the way down to the private life of the Japanese. So 
it can be said that Shinto is the kernel of Japanese tradition.  
 This chapter has attempted to explain Shinto as a Japanese tradition. Before 
examining Shinto, the chapter clarified the term tradition (Section 2.1.1). Tradition can 
be any idea or practice that is passed down over successive generations. Or it could be an 
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idea or practice constructed recently for some purpose but presented as an inheritance. In 
this line of thought, an invented tradition can be considered a tradition if it comes to be 
handed down in the manner of any other tradition. Moreover, seemingly abandoned 
practices are still part of tradition because their memory is a legacy that the present 
tradition cannot escape. The chapter focused on distinguishing continuing from archaic 
aspects of Shinto and on identifying which ideas and practices have persisted most fully 
in Shinto and which have not.  
 Section 2.1.2 stressed that tradition does not necessarily constitute the character 
of the entire community—a community may have many traditions. The paradigm of 
communal practices is often exaggerated. Japan and the Japanese are such case; the caste 
system, social obligations, one‟s group loyalty, and other Japanese social norms 
generalize the Japanese. Yet “the Japanese” are diverse. As the section reviewed, the 
simplification of the term Japanese is unscientific, yet accepted as it releases people‟s 
anxiety over their identity. My thesis holds that there may be no generalized Japanese 
national character but there are certain social customs that have been practiced by the 
Japanese.  
 Shinto is hardly an essential part of Japanese identity, given cultural differences 
within and between different Japanese traditions.
146
 Yet Shinto is uniquely Japanese in 
the sense that the Japanese people regard the national symbol, the Tenno, as the 
ascendant of the Kami.
147
 Although there are Shinto shrines outside of Japan and newly 
                                                          
146. This point was made by Mark Teeuwen in “Western Understanding and Misunderstanding 
of Shinto.” 
147. According to the Japanese myth, the first Tenno, Jimmu, is the grandson of Ninigi-no-
mikoto, the grandson of the Sun Goddess. See in part II of Ashton, Nihongi.  
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founded missionary schools worldwide, the way Shinto evolved from the cult of Kami is 
original to Japan. In other words, the Japanese have passed Shinto practices from one 
generation to the next down to the present day. As a matter of fact, the Japanese yearly 
events are not only Shinto practices but also Buddhist customs, such as the Bon festivals 
in mid-August. Nonetheless, it can be said that the Kami-cults of Shinto are the oldest 
continuing elements in Japanese tradition. 
 Identifying Shinto as a Japanese tradition, Section 2.2 gave a brief summary of 
history in Shinto‟s moral aspect to illuminate the process of forming its ideas. What the 
section found is that Shinto morality has been influenced by other ideas as well as by 
political calculations of the Japanese of that period. On the one hand, Shinto has been 
justified by politically motivated old scriptures, such as Five books of Shinto, Kojiki and 
Nihon Shoki. On the other hand, Shinto theologies have been established by borrowing 
religious concepts from the continent of Asia. Therefore, Shinto history shows that 
although the way it developed is particular, the contents of Shinto tradition are not pure 
or original. Given that Shinto morality constitutes of ideas that come from different 
traditions, it can be said that Shinto embraces both universal and particular. In short, by 
showing multiplicity in Shinto history, Section 2.2 served as a prelude to delve into 
Shinto‟s universal elements that go beyond a simplified picture of either a universalist or 
particularist tendency in a tradition.  
 The next step the chapter considered was how to carry the research into tradition 
in Shinto and its morality. Focusing on tradition, Chapter 2.3 firstly looked at the present 
formation of Shinto morality, which seemed to appear in Three Foundation Principles, 
and Shinto Edification. Dismantling both The Principles and Edification, the chapter 
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divided contemporary Shinto morality into three types, namely, tradition, past tradition, 
and new tradition. At the individual level, the idea of Keishin Suso and man‟s 
enlightenment seem to be continued traditions, while the suggestion of “Shinto-like 
personality” or detail in enlightenment can be said to be new tradition. At regional and 
domestic level, the idea of co-existence and cooperation in a community has been 
significant throughout the centuries. However, community in Japanese mythology 
signifies the Japanese land solely, therefore, the third concern of The Principles and 
Shinto Edification, namely international cooperation, seems to be a newly arrived idea. 
Offering spiritual enrichment, Shinto, nonetheless, seeks a settlement in which the colour 
of distinguishable Shinto morality remains bright in the international norms.   
 In sum, this chapter has introduced Shinto through a historical lens to get a close-
up view of its morality. Behind the general image of Shinto (a religion without doctrine), 
Shintoists have historically attempted to find original principles. Shinto‟s continuing 
tradition, such as internal perfection, the idea of cooperation with a current concern for 









Chapter 3 Shinto’s Universal Morality 
 
3.1 Two Kinds of Universal Moralities 
This section elaborates universal claims in Shinto morality. The section argues that the 
virtue of being pure in mind and body, and post-war Shrine Shinto‟s global concern for 
the human good, are universal elements in Shinto morality.  
 
3.1.1 Embedded Western Universal Morality. Shinto morality was shaped historically by 
assimilating ideas from other traditions. Most recently, post-war Shrine Shinto 
incorporated the idea of western universal humanity as a part of Shinto tradition, which 
was codified as the third principles in The Principles and Shinto Edification. Although 
individual households and local shrines are the institutions that practice Shinto tradition 
at the individual and regional level, Shrine Shinto‟s embedded western ideas are 
advanced internationally by the International Shinto Foundation (ISF).
148
 As Shinto‟s 
international representative body, ISF was recognized as a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) by the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI) in 1997. The 
organization participates in annual DPI/NGO Conferences that tackle global concerns, 




                                                          
148. International Shinto Foundation‟s official website. 
149. I call universal humanity promoted by UN as western universal morality. I am aware, 
however, that UN activities which aim to promote the human good do not necessarily represent 
“western” morality. Nevertheless, considering the aspect such as western influence in the 
formation of UN and on its activities, and philosophy behind their activities in particular, I argue 
that universal humanity postulated by UN should have a great deal of relevance to “western” 
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ISF has advanced its views at the several international conferences sponsored by 
the UN. In Tokyo, New York, and Moscow, ISF organized workshops to discuss the 
spiritual approach to martial arts by celebrating “the 2005 International Year of Sport and 
Physical Education”. In the following year, ISF held a workshop for “the International 
Year of Desert and Desertification”, in which ISF addressed Shinto perspective on the 
importance of preserving nature; the Kami exists in nature so that one should reconsider 
the value of nature (further discussion in Subsection 3.1.2).
150
 It can be said that Shrine 
Shinto attempts to participate in the discussion of common international issues according 
to its own moral perspective.  
The primary objective of ISF is not to proselytize but to disseminate Shinto‟s 
traditional beliefs to counter the fact that Shinto was the state religion that justified 
Japan‟s expansionism in the past: 
 
The Shinto Kokusai Gattukai (the International Shinto Foundation) is 
being established to dispel such misunderstandings about Shinto and 
introduce its qualities as one of the most liberal and broad-minded 
religions on the planet. Shinto is among the few sects in the world which 
does not oppose any other religion's philosophy. Beyond that a major aim 
of the foundation is to disseminate Japanese culture to provide a clearer 
understanding of all aspects of Japan.
151
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
moral tradition. Shrine Shinto agrees with such western universal morality by taking part in UN 
activities.   
150. International Shinto Foundation, “Quadrennial Report.”  




Having established an office in New York, London, Moscow, and Hangzhou in China, 
ISF holds events to provide information about Shinto as well as related Japanese customs, 
including Shinto ritual. By refraining from acting like a missionary organization, ISF can 
more objectively show how Shinto is entwined with Japanese culture.  
 One can say, however, that Shinto morality appears to be self-contradictory with 
respect to the universalist/particularist dichotomy. On the one hand, embedded western 
tradition in Shinto is evidenced by ISF‟s active participation in international conferences 
that concerns universal humanity. On the other hand, by promoting Japanese culture, ISF 
distinguishes Shinto‟s particularity from other cultures. In fact, the significance of one‟s 
local particularity can be proven by both the worship of ancestors and Shinto‟s idea on 
tutelary Kami under which everyone is protected by a local Kami. As explained in 
Subsection 2.3.3, Shrine Shinto believes in the materialization of “world culture” in 
which different local traditions co-exist in the world. In search of mutual understanding 
at the international level, one should maintain a local identity rather than turn into a 
transnational cosmopolitan. Shrine Shinto intends to contribute distinguishable Shinto 
morality to the formation of “world culture”. Therefore, Shinto remains as a particular 
tradition while it embraces universal claims.  
So far, I have attempted to illustrate that when Shrine Shinto seeks compatibility 
with international norms it aims neither to abandon nor promote Shinto‟s original 
morality. Although the significance of local identity has been explicated, the reason why 
Shrine Shinto seeks accommodation with western morality remains unclear. Probably it 
requires a better explanation than that Shinto has always adopted ideas from abroad; by 
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showing itself to be a flexible tradition, Shinto morality is compatible with western 
universal morality. The next subsection will explore Shinto‟s original universal morality, 





3.1.2. Original Universal Morality: the Concept of Musubi. In 1995 the international 
symposium on the theme Shinto-Its Universality was held in Tokyo by ISF to discuss 
Shinto‟s universal and particular aspect. In this symposium, scholars and participants, 
both Japanese and non-Japanese, argued that there were three areas of universality in 
Shinto: 1) Shinto‟s nature cult, 2) Shinto‟s role in forming communities and 3) the notion 
of pure mind and healthy body according to the concept of Musubi.  
 First, a founding member of ISF, Toji Kamata, argues that despite Shinto‟s 
internal diversities, such as Shrine Shinto and Sectarian Shinto, there are traditionally 
three levels of grand cults in Shinto, those practicing reverence for nature, ancestors, and 
the Tenno respectively. Among the three levels, the nature cult is shared by other 
religions, while the other two levels, especially the cult of the Tenno are allegedly 
distinctive features of Shinto. According to Kamata, the Japanese did not conceive nature 
as objective: “Rather, nature and the Kami were inextricable bound up together within 
                                                          
152. Here I focus on the moral aspect of Shinto, that is, how Shinto morality is compatible with 
western universal morality. However, from a political and social perspective, one can say that 
recognizing western moral universalism could be a political necessity of Shrine Shinto in the 
retrospect of an infamous relation between Shinto and militarism. Shinto had been used as an 
ideology that advanced aggressive expansionism from Meiji period up to Japan‟s defeat in the 
Second World War. As Breen and Teeuwen argue in New History of Shinto, the defeat brought 
the shrines a loss of state financial backup as well as of public sympathy. Against public hostility, 
Shrine Shinto needed to find a way of its survival. By following Breen and Teeuwen‟s analysis, 
one can argue that ISF‟s support for universal humanity creates a new role for Shinto, which 
distinguishes itself from the parochial type of war-time Shintoism.  
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nature.”153 This belief that human beings should endure harmony with nature (where the 
Kami inhabits) is an idea embraced by animism, so Kamata argues Shinto‟s nature cult 
can be seen to have something in common with other religious practices.  
Second, Shrine Shinto appears to be unique to Japan in being a part of Japan‟s 
customary social system. Katsunoshin Sakurai, the former President of The Association 
of Shinto Shrines, observes that Shrine Shinto is a national religion, not merely an ethnic 
creed. In Japan, every community has one or more shrines dedicated to a tutelary Kami; 
even newly emerged residential areas build shrines and hold Matsuri. But there is no 
common tradition among those dwelling in a given community because their religions 
differ from family to family. Erecting a shrine and conducting Matsuri permits 
neighbours to come together despite their religious differences. Consequently Matsuri 
organized by the local shrine constitute a new common tradition which can be passed on 
from generation to generation. However, the tutelary Kami‟s role in forming 
communities is not exclusively a Japanese phenomenon but it is comparable to, for 
example, the role of village churches in Europe. Therefore, Sakurai believes that the role 
of shrines and the Kami in unifying people is the universal character of Shinto. At the 
national level, Amaterasu Omikami or the Sun Goddess functions as the supreme God 
that is worshipped by different people. In this sense, the idea of national religion is not 
particular to Shinto; it can also be seen in other countries, such as in the United States. 
Citing Robert Bellah‟s “civil religion”, Sakurai points out a similarity between American 
political leaders‟ frequent references to God in their speeches and the implicit presence 
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see International Shinto Foundation, Shinto-Its Universality, 84. 
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of the Kami in Japan.
154
 Therefore, according to Sakurai, the features of Shinto are not 
particular in the sense that they play a role in promoting communal and national unity.  
The third category of Shinto‟s universality goes to morality, namely to keep one‟s 
pure mind and healthy body (discussed in 2.3.2). According to Professor Akira Nakanishi, 
Chairman of the International Shinto Foundation, mind and body are the essence of every 
individual: 
 
All existence is thus educed to temporary and fragmentary things, and 
even our own precious self to nothing more than an individual body which 




As explained in Subsection 2.3.2, Shinto morality has its roots in the concept of Musubi: 
all things in the universe are generated by the Kami spirit called Musubi. In the context of 
human life, individual mind and body originate from the Kami. But because different 
people nevertheless think and behave differently, we must allow for human diversity and 
pluralism. In other words, mind and body are equally the starting point of thinking and 
acting. Human actions vary because they are the consequence of factors other than one‟s 
mind and body. Yet as long as maintaining a high-minded soul or mental attitude upright, 
any actions must at least have good intention, whatever the outcome. At the international 
level, pluralism is not a counter act to universalism because different people with good 
intention are able to create a harmonious world. Because the source of human diversity 
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155. Nakanishi, “Opening Remarks,” 66. 
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can be reduced to the individuals‟ mind and body, “universality and particularity are 
properly two sides of the same thing”.156  
 One can argue that among the three types of Shinto‟s universality addressed, the 
concept of pure mind and healthy body with the idea of Musubi is most relevant to the 
discussion of moral universalism. The concept of pure mind and healthy body is about 
individual morality whereas Shinto‟s nature cult and its role of forming communities are 
related to religious rites. The definition of Musubi per se (i.e. the Kami spirit that creates 
all things on the universe) does not point at a moral system. However, the concept of 
Musubi consequently created Shinto morality, namely the importance of maintaining a 
pure, bright, and sincere mind with a healthy body. Because this is more like a discipline 
that shapes one‟s attitude toward the conduct of life, it does not need to be recognized by 
the people who are unfamiliar with Shinto tradition.  
While morality in English denotes a sense of obligation in a human relationship, 
in Japanese its meanings primarily designates the way of/to virtue (Dotoku mentioned in 
Introduction, pp.8-9); one‟s conscience through which one displays decent behaviour 
toward other people. It should be stressed that this sense of morality, namely first 
improving one‟s internal character to behave decently in human relations, does not 
exclude non-Japanese. In this sense, the concept of being pure in mind and body can be 
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157. One can say that Japanese sense of morality is close to Kant‟s principle of respect or 
Hegelian morality. My thesis, however, defends Shinto‟s universal elements without comparing 
it with other ethical systems.  
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It can be argued that Shinto embraces universal morality in the name of a 
particular tradition. Despite the different outlook, human beings are fundamentally all the 
same given that they are living beings endowed with mind and body. (And Shintoists 
optimistically believe that the co-existence of different cultures in the world is possible 
regardless of one‟s particularity in thinking and acting when each one of us on earth 
maintains healthy mind and body.) In keeping with this line of thought, it is conceivable 
that Shrine Shinto, while sustaining its particularity, could embed foreign ideas such as 
morality as it is understood in western tradition. Therefore, Shinto‟s morality constitutes 
a mixture of universal and particular elements, which goes beyond the bipolarity of 
universalism and particularism.   
 
3.2 Reconsidering Methods of Conversation: Voluntary Recognition 
As presented in Chapter One, there are two major discussions in this thesis, namely the 
tension between moral universalism and cultural particularism, and the matter of how to 
recognize universal morality inherent in different traditions. In the old debate on 
universalism and particularism, the generalised and simplified picture of the debate is a 
persistent problem; western tradition is associated with the idea of moral universalism 
and non-western traditions are seen as locally specific. Put simply, non-western moral 
traditions are conventionally contrasted with western moral universalism. As discussed, 
the case of Shinto proves that universal morality can exist in a non-western or so-called 
particularist tradition. This in turn suggests that moral traditions are culturally particular, 
but that universal elements can be found in more than one of them. In this way, one can 
imagine a multiplicity of universally applicable moralities across traditions. However, the 
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idea of plurality in moral universalisms entails a difficult task—how to recognize 
universal moralities which are different from one‟s own. It is certainly challenging to 
admit and incorporate a given universal morality into one‟s local practices.  This is the 
topic to be examined in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Reassessing Preclusive Persuasion: A Case of Shinto Morality. It is not easy to 
recognize universally applicable moralities embraced by other people as one‟s own. In 
fact, misunderstandings often arise in cross-cultural comparisons and dialogues, which, 
nonetheless, aim to find a sense of shared global human good. As mentioned in the 
Introduction (pp.6-7), Will Kymlicka argues for a persuasive method as a mode of 
conversation in open dialogue aimed at identifying a minimal set of universal standards 
among different ethical traditions. In a cross-cultural exchange on morals, “persuasion” 
rather than coercion is the most appropriate way of engaging with other peoples‟ ideas. 
Certainly, imposing one‟s self-evidenced universal morality on others by force is 
reminiscent of the Japanese behaviour toward their Asian subjects during the Second 
World War.  
However, “persuasion” can be differentiated from “mutual understanding” in a 
certain case (Introduction, pp.6-7). That is, one may attempt to persuade other people of 
what one believes true before understanding the mindset of these people. Consequently 
the former tends to ignore a possibility—the latter might also have a universally 
applicable morality to persuade or introduce. But the clash of persuasion is not a 
desirable outcome when people exchange their ideas for the sake of creating harmony. 
Alternatively, one can imagine that the persuader tries to convince other people of his 
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belief after understanding cultural differences. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the 
persuader, although understanding other people, reflects or even adopts ideas he has been 
confronted with.  In short, it can be said that the persuader affirms the rightness of his 
belief and of its universal applicability despite knowing about the differences. By 
deflecting ideas other than his own, he remains adamant about his universal standard and 
seeks to spread it (this posture is what I call preclusive persuasion). 
Shinto‟s universal morality may not be appreciated through preclusive persuasion. 
Shinto‟s universally applicable morality, namely the idea of “pure mind and healthy 
body”, is founded upon two independent components: 1) a theory of Musubi (i.e. the 
Kami spirit that creates all things in the universe) and its subsequent perception; namely 
(the Kami given) individual mind and body are the very source of human actions and 2) a 
faith of maintaining a virtuous mind and body. The first component is a holistic concept 
that endorses all humanity. The second point is the morality that evolves from the first. 
And these two components constitute Shinto morality. Nonetheless, borrowing Walzer‟s 
words,
 158
 one can say that the second component is already distinguished as a culturally 
“thick” morality from a mere concept of Musubi. Hence, Shinto morality is hardly a 
neutral morality which stands alone. Probably Walzer is right to say that even a “thin” 
morality or a universally applicable concept entails a particular background. In this line 
of thought, the concept of Musubi is, despite its universal outlook, still unique as all 
things in the universe have a root in a Japanese concept of the Kami. On this score, 
Shinto suggests that seemingly universally applicable morals cannot detach themselves 
from their local origins.  
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Because the world has no neutral morality that stands without a culturally specific 
background, one way we might find a set of moral standards practised by everyone is to 
“acknowledge the great diversity of historical processes, and (to) look for similar or 
overlapping outcomes: locate commonality at the endpoint of difference”.159 In this view, 
persuasion is not a primary method of seeking a common morality. As Walzer writes, a 
shared universal morality “is less the product of persuasion than of mutual recognition 
among the protagonists of different fully developed moral cultures”. 160  This in turn 
leaves room to reconsider how rightful the persuasive method is. 
 By calling this method “preclusive persuasion”, I want to highlight the 
assumption that the persuader knows which morality he should persuade others to accept 
and on what grounds he can convince others of its truth. As seen in the universalist 
stance on human rights or the Asian traditionalists‟ claim for the Right to Development, 
the chief motive of the persuaders can be said that their morality is true and universally 
applicable so that everyone should recognize its principles. However, Shinto‟s original 
universal morality does not allow this linear reasoning. On the one hand, the idea of 
keeping “pure mind and healthy body” is universally applicable in the sense that it does 
not exclude people unfamiliar with Shinto tradition. On the other hand, it is the principle 
that binds man‟s mental freedom; otherwise it would incur the risk of Shinto‟s thought 
control. Although it is still ideal if one keeps a high-minded soul and clean body, there is 
no better reason than this moral excellence for Shintoists to persuade others to ratify the 
principle. In sum, pure mind and healthy body as Shinto‟s universal morality can be best 
                                                          
159. Ibid., 15. 
160. Ibid., 17. 
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recognized without preclusive persuasion. This is because 1) it is a culturally “thick” 
morality, and 2) it promotes an ideal to every individual. Any effort to persuade other 
people to accept Shinto morality, therefore, might sound rather manipulative to those 
who try to understand it. Shinto morality vindicates the claim that universal morality 
need not adopt a domineering manner in demanding universal recognition.  
 
3.2.2 The Idea of Voluntary Recognition. By arguing against preclusive persuasion, I do 
not mean to revoke universally appreciated human rights nor denounce “persuasion” as 
utterly inappropriate. My argument is that the idea of universally applicable morality 
does not necessarily require an effort to persuade others of its universality. The idea of 
voluntary recognition, as already briefly explained in the Introduction (pp.7-8), is 
contrary to the act of preclusive persuasion. Voluntary recognition implied that one is 
willing to understand other people, whereas preclusive persuasion indicates that the 
persuader is justified in aiming to convince other people what he believes to be right.   
The idea of voluntary recognition might resonate with what Charles Taylor calls 
“unforced consensus on human rights”. This is because Taylor‟s theory relies on neither 
the legitimacy of coercion nor on making a persuasive case for some conception of 
universal morality. Instead, it suggests that people of different ethical traditions can 
achieve similar humanitarian ideals in their own ways. If human rights rest on universal 
principles recognized across traditions or principles that are compatible with other ethical 
traditions, everyone would eventually approach them without being persuaded. While 
human rights distinctly reflect the right-thinking derived from western history, as Taylor 
exemplifies, a similar conception can be found in Thai Buddhism. Buddhist principles 
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protect human rights, and the non-violence principle deters one‟s use of coercion in order 
to enhance individual autonomy. In this respect, “a rather different route has been 
travelled to a similar goal”.161 This is not to prove that Buddhist tradition too ought to be 
universally recognized voluntarily. Rather, Taylor‟s case study simply suggests, by 
means of an example, that two different traditions can have a similar goal or ideal. One 
can find locals fighting for the human good on their own without coercion or persuasion 
from, for instance, the western human rights perspective. As shown in Section 3.1, post-
war Shrine Shinto‟s incorporation of western ideas is an example of recognizing a 
universal morality different from Shinto‟s its own. Devotees of Shrine Shinto were able 
to understand the stance of western universal morality because roughly similar principles 
were already visible from their own moral standpoint.    
 Nonetheless, most people are inclined to deem their tradition universal, not a 
particular culture among many.
162
 In this respect, one may wonder how different 
persuasive talk really is from coercion, when a persuader, in search of a world consensus 
espousing his truth, ignores the presence of many other moralities which also embrace 
universally applicable elements.  
A difference between voluntary recognition and  preclusive persuasion is that the 
former does not limit the goal at which each tradition eventually aims, while the latter 
presents the persuader‟s claim (such as western moral universalism) as the ultimate goal 
of all ethical traditions. The logic of the persuader is that his universal morality is the one 
to be applied to the rest, all of which are seen as particular cultures. So again, the 
                                                          
161. Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” 135. 
162. Ibid., 143. 
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persuading party knows which moral claims to put on the agenda and anticipates more or 
less the success of their persuasion. But in reality, the method of preclusive persuasion 
may end up with the collision of self-asserting people, as seen in the Asian values debate 
in which universalist critics and Asian traditionalists compete over the question of who 
owns the most superior values.  
 
3.2.3 Voluntary Recognition and Individual Morality. Voluntary recognition may, 
however, be too passive as a method of cross-cultural dialogue. Leaving one to recognize 
the moral significance of another cultures‟ ideas may leave one wondering, whether a 
universally recognized morality will ever be found. Or the passivity of voluntary 
recognition may give the appearance that one is indifferent to one another, and that can 
be a cause of misunderstanding. Despite these limitations, the idea of voluntary 
recognition remains significant as a reminder; the persuader needs to know that at the 
end the demonstration of his/her thinking, an individual can be the one who decides to 
agree or disagree with the presented model of morality. It is natural for the persuader of a 
universal morality to anticipate a positive feedback from the interlocutor, which is why 
this persuasion is worth carrying out. But as detailed earlier in this section, Shinto‟s 
original universal morality presents a case that can better be recognized voluntarily than 
attained through persuasion because it relates to an individual‟s self-discipline. The 
persuaders‟ self-assured successful demonstration might bring tension and create a moral 
inconsistency when the recipient of a suggested moral model objects the persuader‟s 
proposals. The persuaders, such as universalist critics or Asian traditionalists, should not 
use their own personal convictions to dictate and impose their ideas on other people.  
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An example of voluntary recognition could be the subject of moral education 
introduced in the Japanese educational system in 1958.
163
 This moral education 
encourages young people, especially students of elementary and lower secondary school, 
to contemplate what morality is. As a part of education this curriculum gives students the 
opportunity to discuss what is good/bad through which the youth starts engaging with 
questions of high morality. There are mainly four areas for students to work on: 1) the 
self, 2) the relationship with others, 3) the relationship with nature, 4) the meaning of 
being a member of a group and society. The study materials differ according to the grade, 
but a common theme of the moral education is the “understanding of the value of human 
life, consideration for others, awareness of social norms such as judgment between right 
and wrong, and a sense of public duty”.164 In an effort to avoid its becoming a static 
education, there are no exams held or marks given for this subject; rather, it serves the 
function of giving students time to ponder their life and social role. According to the 
guideline of the moral education, school teachers should elicit voluntary consciousness 
about morality from the students.
165
 
                                                          
163. As a part of school programme, moral education existed in the pre-war period labelled 
Imperial Prescript on Education founded by Tenno Meiji to formulate the virtues of the Japanese. 
However, after the war, GHQ considered this subject to be the source of a dangerous morale 
which fuelled militarism and was consequently abolished. In 1958, nonetheless, the subject of 
moral education officially revived in a different manner from militarism and Shintoism. That is, a 
new moral education was aimed at cultivating an individual as a member of a harmonious society.  
164. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan. 
165. Ibid. As the teachers would not concede to their students deviating from morals, the 
discussion on morality in a class might involve the persuasion of a given moral example in a 
quest of harmony. However, it should be noted that (preclusive) persuasion in my thesis is the 
method of conversation between adults who have already understood morality, which is different 
from the moral education talked above.  
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It can be argued that the Japanese sense of morality, which relates to one‟s 
character, has been tradition under the influence of Shinto. Long before The Principles, 
moral cultivation was promoted by the Shintoists of the Tenth Century. They propagated 
the idea that the act of worship enhanced the power of the Kami. In later periods, Yoshida 
Shinto sought enlightening the masses through Shinto scriptures that idealized one‟s 
attitude, such as purity, compassion, and honesty.
 166
  In the fashion of Confucian-
oriented Shinto theology, the Meiji government promoted a programme of moral 
education called Shushin, which was based on Confucian ethics of loyalty, filial piety 
and diligence. However, by seeking to revive a sense of classic “Japanese morality” 
centred on the Tenno, the government proposed twelve virtues including self-enrichment, 
decency, and patriotism and other moral standards. This codified discipline was called 
the Imperial Rescript on Education, which was signed by Tenno Meiji in 1890. In the 
post-war era, the Association of Shinto Shrines has endorsed Shinto Edification, which 
attempts to educate the public in the concept of Shinto morality. Revived school 
education with the name of Dotoku can be seen as secular practice as it is an independent 
programme from Shinto Edification. Nonetheless, one can argue that the Japanese sense 
of morality has associated the moral significance of enriching oneself to rational conduct 
and good deeds in human relationship.   
Furthermore, the voluntary character of Shinto morality is present in the 
propositions of both The Principle and Shinto Edification. According to Sokyo Ono, who 
                                                          
166. A direct translation to English is “honesty” but the understanding of the word remains 
controversial; Miyuki Takahashi points out that “honesty” in the context of Shino of that period 
stands for one‟s attitude toward the Kami rather than the standard meaning of the modern times, 
while other scholars read the word as one‟s mind without black-thoughts. Takahashi, “Ise Shinto 
Shisou no Hattuten to Keishou,” 58; Ishida, Shinto Shisoushu, 110-111. 
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drafted The Principles, there are several propositions behind these codes. For instance, 
The Principles are not a dogma but meant to be practical suggestions for shaping one‟s 
attitude in everyday life.
167
 Although a dogmatic element has developed historically, 
Shinto has its roots in customary and folk culture. The idea is that a dogma should not be 
established after just the tenth anniversary of the Association but that more time is 
needed to compile the sacred scriptures.
168
 This leads to the second intentions, that is, 
The Principles do not yet offer a rigid ethical code but are open to the reader‟s 
interpretation. Ono argues that because The Principles does not prescribe an 
unchangeable discipline, readers might interpret it differently and it would be ideal if 
worthy constructions out of many readings drew attention.
 169
 Therefore, leaving one to 
interpret the ethical code, Shinto morality marks voluntary character.  Similarly, one can 
recall that ISF‟s basic stance is not to proselytize its belief. As Subsection 3.1.1 
introduced, ISF is aiming at disseminating Shinto idea without persuading it to the other 
people. In sum, Shinto morality along with the concept of Dotoku, depends on the 
individual to interpret, absorb, or reject its ideas. Therefore, it can be said that the idea of 





                                                          
167. Ono, “„Keishinseikatsu no Koryo‟ ni tsuite,” 106. 
168. Ashizu, “Shinto to Keiten,” 42. 
169. Ono, “„Keishinseikatsu no Koryo‟ ni tsuite,” 103. 
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3.3 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has attempted to elucidate two elements in Shinto‟s moral universalism, 
namely embedded western universal humanity and Shinto‟s original morality. As the 
argument responded to the questions raised in Chapter One, the insight of Shinto‟s 
universal morality designates two points: 1) there is universally applicable morality in a 
seemingly particular tradition, which in turn affords scope for reconsidering the 
dichotomous idea of western moral universalism versus the traditions of “the rest”, and 
2) the concept of voluntary recognition as a mode of understanding differences in cross-
cultural dialogue. 
 The answer to the first point of the arguments was that Shinto‟s original morality, 
a morality of keeping pure in mind and body, is universally applicable, yet the practice of 
this universal concept has been inherited exclusively by the Japanese. In other words, it is 
a particular practice of the Japanese with universal attributes, though that aspect is 
obscure. Hence Shinto‟s standpoint does not rest at the conventional division of 
universalism and particularism. This is because Shinto‟s universality rests with the 
individual who can be reduced to a creature with mind and body—a commonality to all 
mankind, while Shinto‟s particularity is a result of the choices of that mind and body in 
different contexts. Simply put, universality in Shinto signifies being a creature of mind 
and body whilst particularity is expressed by individuals through that mind and body. In 
this sense, universalism and particularism are less contradictory than the usual academic 
definitions imply.  
 The argument above then elucidated a picture of plural forms of universal 
moralities. Under diversity of universal moralities, a vexing problem of the old 
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discussion of universalism and particularism is how one recognizes someone else‟s moral 
significance that is related to all the people. And this was the second theme of discussion. 
Shinto voluntarily understood western moral principles in the sense that Shintoists 
wanted to interpret the aim of UN, which was to achieve the human good. Through 
Shinto‟s own understanding, namely the concept of Musubi and a moral requirement of 
keeping pure in one‟s mind and body, Shinto incorporated western universal morality. As 
Shinto‟s universal morality rests on the very foundation of human beings, the creature of 
mind and body, it can be said that Shinto has been historically flexible to embed 
moralities of other traditions. In short, Shinto recognized a different morality not as the 
result of (preclusive) persuasion but through its own interpretation. Therefore, Shinto‟s 
embedded moral universalism is a good example to argue for voluntary recognition as 
the method to understand other people‟s moral traditions.  
 Voluntary recognition can be an alternative understanding of morality for the 
following reasons. First, Shinto‟s universally applicable morality entails culturally 
specific contents. Although the whole concept is tailored to be applicable to all human 
beings, it has a root in the Japanese concept of the Kami. In the end, if one is not able to 
understand the concept of the Kami, one would find the entire Shinto morality odd. 
Therefore, Shinto morality can be recognized not by persuasion but only through one‟s 
willingness to learn.  
 The second reason for suggesting voluntary recognition is that Shinto morality is 
about how far one can attain the idealized stage of internal perfection. Probably the 
greatest setback in the dichotomous discussion of universalism and particularism is the 
assertiveness of its moral proponents. These moral advocates are self-confident on the 
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grounds that their morality is everyone‟s interest so that it must be universally recognized. 
The promoter of natural law, human rights, or the advocate of the Right to Development 
respectively claims that their moral standpoints are universally applicable and 
worthwhile to be recognized by all. However, in the case of Shinto morality, the degree 
of recognition relies on one‟s awareness. Maintaining a virtuous mind and body 
constitutes the ideal man‟s character as a sort of pre-requirement effectively to engage in 
obligations in society.  
 However, it should be stressed that the theory of voluntary recognition can only 
be one among many other methods to understand other people at the most basic level of 
cross-cultural conversations.  Without zeal to persuade the other people, one can easily 
be indifferent in making an effort to create shared universal principles. Therefore, the 
theory of voluntary recognition does not offer a solution to problems associated with the 
different stage of the conversation, such as how to reach a consensus on a genuine 
universal principle without imposition.  
Despite this limitation, the theory of voluntary recognition serves as an important 
reminder when cross-cultural learning takes place. That is, the persuader of moral 
principles should bear in mind to be open to any reactions he receives from the 
interlocutor whom he chose to address with his moral enthusiasm—whether the reaction 
may be one of agreement or rejection. One‟s intolerance toward the other people‟s 
disagreement remains a persistent obstacle on the way to the co-existence of people in 
the world of ethical pluralism. Arguing for voluntary recognition, I do not mean to say 
that human rights or any other moralities are in the end not recognized at all. (Nor is it to 
claim that persuasion is an improper conduct of open dialogue. In fact, one can say that 
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persuasion was worthwhile when Asian political leaders have admitted the significance 
of human rights as codified in the Bangkok Declaration.) Rather my focus is a type of 
universal morality that is applicable to all without demanding everyone‟s recognition. 
For this reason, voluntary recognition can play a significant role to understand this kind 






















For a certain generation of the Japanese, the Kami and the Tenno once represented the 
absolute moral high-ground. After the war, when many Japanese had lost confidence in 
such absolutes, Shinto‟s customary system prevailed over its political aspects as more 
appropriate to contemporary Japanese society. As a moral tradition, Shinto borrowed 
ideas from elsewhere in Asia and even beyond. Therefore, it can be said that many 
elements of Shinto comprise a wide range of ideas including western universal morality. 
In short, Shinto, a particular tradition, embraces universality. The presence of universal 
aspects in Shinto, therefore, challenges a fixed dichotomy between universalism and 
particularism. One does not need to see the debate with a mode of confrontation, whether 
one is a universalist or particularist. Instead one can focus on the plurality of universal 
moralities to consider how one recognizes another‟s moral ideas. 
Certainly, Shinto is not the only example that disproves the claim that a genuine 
morality must be permanent and invariable. The principles of human rights also illustrate 
the idea of universal morality as advocated by certain people (such as universalist critics) 
of a particular era.
170
  In practice, therefore, a “universal principle” is not one that is 
permanent and omnipresent from the beginning of humanity up to the present. Moreover, 
as seen in Shinto morality, morality entails local features in its universal claims. This 
leads to the following question: “on what grounds can one persuade his or her 
interlocutor to endorse one‟s notion of absolute morality?” Accordingly, the second 
theme discussed in this thesis was the persuasive methodology that is characteristic of 
much cross-cultural talk.  
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In face of the abundance of moral traditions across the world, probably the most 
difficult but necessary task is to understand cultural differences before proselytizing in 
the name of a self-asserted universal morality. Although I have used the principles of 
human rights to illustrate the universalist claim, this in no way negates reaching a 
compromise on the universal recognition of human rights principles. Indeed, it would be 
desirable for both universalist critics and their rivals to find a middle ground on, for 
instance, the legitimacy of local interpretations of universal human rights principles (this 
is the model offered by the second type of universalist critic detailed in 1.2.2) or of other 
alternative standpoints. In reality, however, the dissent between universalist critics and 
Asian traditionalists persists, which raises the opportunity to reconsider the old 
discussion of universalism and particularism. Hence, this thesis focused on two areas of 
reassessment: 1) a fixed dichotomy in traditions between universal and particular, and 2) 
the mode of cross-cultural conversation.   
 To discuss the points above, the thesis started with analyzing problems that lie at 
the centre of the debate on universalism and particularism (Chapter One). First, Section 
1.1 drew attention to the aspect that the term moral universalism was usually associated 
with western moral concepts, such as natural law or human rights. Ignoring the 
possibility that other moral universalisms might exist in different traditions, some 
universalists insist that their principle is both universally applicable and universally 
recognized. (Because my thesis exemplifies those who assert universal applicability and 
recognition for human rights and/or natural law, it calls their belief western moral 
universalism). The problem of western moral universalism is its narrow viewpoint; a 
self-assured western moral universalism dismisses the existence of universal moralities 
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other than human rights and natural law. Moreover, believing in a single, absolute set of 
moral principles, universalist critics (and even Asian traditionalists) claim that their 
principles are universally significant, hence worth being recognized by all the people on 
the globe.  
Section 1.2 reviewed the debate on “Asian values” as an example that further 
illustrated and confirmed the problem of western moral universalism.  It can be said that 
the bottom line of the Asian values debate is marked by the dissent between Asian 
traditionalists and universalist critics on the question of imposing a static implementation 
of western ideas on human rights. Although there was an agreement on the overall 
significance of human rights principles per se, the debate deviated from the point of 
agreement. This is because both Asian traditionalists and universalist critics asserted their 
own moral truths, while rejecting one another‟s traditions. From the viewpoint of Asian 
traditionalists, western moral tradition is too alien to Confucius-heritage Asian societies 
to be adopted in those societies. The first type of universalist critic, on the other hand, 
invalidate “Asian values” as an authentic moral tradition by claiming that the appeal to 
such values is merely a means of political manipulation (Subsection 1.2.2). Asian 
traditionalists lose credibility when they use the idea of “Asian values” as a camouflage 
for domestic human rights abuses.   
 However, there was another type of universalist critic that sought a balance 
between western universal morality and local interpretations of such morality 
(Subsection 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). Scholars such as Donnelly and Chen deliver the most 
promising settlement—to identify localized practices of western universal morality. 
However, this concession is based on the assumption that western universal morality is 
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an absolute concept that should be incorporated into even the most diverse local practices. 
As a result, the possibility that there might be other moral universalisms are obscured and 
denied under the veil of local tradition. Moreover, some adhere to the persuasive method 
in order to advance the view that western moral universalism is the most widely 
recognized moral perspective. However, one can imagine that in a cross-cultural talk, 
there may be other cases of universal moralities that do not equate universal applicability 
with universal recognition. For these cases which do not require universal recognition, 
the persuasion would be intrusive if not coercive as a method of discussion.    
To put the argument briefly, my thesis proposes that 1) a dichotomy between 
universal and particular is inadequate, and that 2) there is a type of universal morality 
that must be recognized voluntarily, not as the outcome of persuasion. Chapter Two 
explored Shinto tradition as an empirical grounding for upcoming discussions. As 
Subsection 2.1.3 explained, Shinto, the Kami cult, has existed throughout Japanese 
history in various forms, from being a part of Buddhism in the middle ages to an element 
in the seasonal Matsuri that people observe even in the Twenty-first Century. Section 2.2 
introduced the history of Shinto morality, which disclosed that Shinto, though uniquely 
Japanese, has been shaped by foreign influences, including Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Taoism, and other ideas. Shinto was never “Shinto” without those influences. Another 
aspect of Shinto lies in the political motivations of those who promote it. Such political 
motivations were often employed for the sake of the Japanese nation in the face of 
foreign encroachment.  
Section 2.3 focused on the contents of Shinto morality. To identify what is and 
was tradition in Shinto morality, the section began with an analysis of the two most 
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recent moral principles, Three Foundation Principles and Shinto Edification. The ideas 
of internal perfection and the communal cooperation have been the core principles in 
Shinto tradition while post-war Shrine Shinto‟s sympathies for western notion on the 
human good became a new part of the tradition. 
Shinto‟s moral universalism can be unearthed in two ways: Shinto‟s embedded 
western universal morality, and Shinto‟s original principles, namely the concept of pure 
mind and healthy body which is universally applicable to all mankind. Chapter Three 
elaborated these two universal elements to discuss the arguments of the thesis. In contrast 
to a presumed dichotomy of universalism and particularism, Shinto‟s moral aspect 
consists of both universal and particular elements. Apart from embedded western 
principles, Shinto has embraced a view that Shinto‟s original morality is applicable to not 
only Japanese but all mankind. As there are universally applicable elements in a local or 
particularist tradition, my thesis argues that the terms universalism and particularism are 
not antonyms for Shinto but co-exist in the tradition.
171
  As seen in the Asian values 
debate, rejecting another‟s tradition from the viewpoint of either universalist or 
particularist fails to see a possibility that a particular tradition might embrace universally 
applicable moralities. Hence this thesis attempted to offer a compromise between 
universalist and particularist standpoints by finding universalist elements in a 
particularist tradition, namely Shinto, the aboriginal creed of Japan. This might be 
valuable in showing that universalism is not located solely in western traditions. 
                                                          




Considering plural forms of universal moralities across traditions, the thesis 
focused on the way one recognizes other people‟s universal moralities. Section 3.2 was 
dedicated to the second argument, voluntary recognition as an alternative mode of cross-
cultural conversation to preclusive persuasion. Some scholars argue that the most 
promising posture of the cross-cultural dialogue is the act of persuasion. As I have 
explained, however, Shinto embedded western universal morality voluntarily, not as a 
response to attempts of persuasion made by the proponents of western moral 
universalism. In recent decades Shinto has begun to adopt western universal humanity, 
which was relevant to the goal of Shinto‟s original universal morality; the materialization 
of a harmonious world through enriching personality by maintaining pure mind and 
healthy body. In this way, it can be said that post-war Shrine Shinto voluntarily 
recognized western universal morality and incorporated western ideas into its body of 
moral ideas.  
The remainder of Chapter Three defended voluntary recognition as an alternative 
mode of open dialogue or, at least for the case of Shinto morality, as a check on 
preclusive persuasion. A point supporting voluntary recognition is that Shinto‟s universal 
applicable morality is culturally “thick”, which means that to understand it one first 
needs to comprehend the concept of Japan‟s Kami.  Within a culturally thick concept, 
Shinto morality embraces a vision that one‟s pure mind and body should contribute to a 
harmonious world. Because this notion holds Shinto‟s ideal of human perfection it goes 
beyond moral ideas, if by moral we mean communal standards of proper conduct. 
Persuading others of Shinto morality is, therefore, an act of controlling one‟s attitude 
toward life as a whole. Therefore, it cannot be communicated via preclusive persuasion. 
106 
 
In sum, Section 3.2 discussed how the case of Shinto proved the existence of a certain 
type of moral tradition more suitable to the mode of voluntary recognition than to 
preclusive persuasion.  
  Indeed, voluntary recognition seems to be the best path forward in the case of 
Shinto morality, given that the foundation of Shinto morality rests on the individual. As 
individuals attain internal perfection, they aim to work for the good of those around them. 
Because Shinto morality deals with individual moral choices, it invites voluntary 
recognition without attempting to convince others to follow Shintoism.   
Following the argument for voluntary recognition as one‟s consciousness, one 
might be left with an impression that Shinto morality is not a morality in the classic sense 
of a standard of behaviour for members of a community, local or universal. Besides 
morality as individual achievement, the thesis emphasizes that the concept of Dotoku (or 
Japanese sense of morality) signifies the Japanese communal judging system. However, 
Shinto morality and the idea of Dotoku suggest that it is necessary to improve one‟s 
character before working for the good of wider communities. Therefore, Shinto ideas 
stress individual morality. In fact, as Subsection 2.3.4 explains, there is no fixed standard 
of right and wrong in Shinto theology (which does not mean that Shintoists ignore a 
sense of what is morally right and wrong, however). But Shinto morality relies on one‟s 
good intention, one that comes out from one‟s pureness, brightness, and sincerity. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the meaning of morality differs from one culture to another. 
Hence we must be open to the possibility that there might be other methods than 
persuasion when understanding morality in a different context. To state an example, I 
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In my view, mutual understanding is the very starting point of cross-cultural talk 
before creating universal principles that transcend all cultural differences. I have argued 
that it is important to understand cultural differences, and that the theory of voluntary 
recognition is a way to do that. One can say, nonetheless, that there will still be 
disagreement over moral universalism despite better mutual understanding. 
Unfortunately voluntary learning is not a remedy that directs a moral consensus among 
different people. Certainly one can predict another difficulty when forming a genuine 
universal morality even among people who are willing to learn cultural values of one 
another. Hence the area for the further research is such as how to reconcile disagreements 
or respect differences that persist even through voluntary recognition. 
The decision making process between the adherents of different traditions would 
be further complicated if hybrid moralities emerged. Scholars often assume that a moral 
tradition is either secular or religious.
173
 However, in terms of the effects of globalization, 
individuals may be influenced by or espouse more than one moral tradition. This in turn 
implies that one‟s moral tradition may go beyond the simplified secular-religious 
division. Although research into public morality remains essential, globalization enables 
individuals to encounter cultural differences through their own personal experiences.  In 
fact, many of the scholars cited in my thesis, including Appiah, Mouer, and Sugimoto, 
                                                          
172. This thesis focused on introducing Shinto morality rather than devoting to the comparison 
with morality in English sense.  
173. Kymlicka and Sullivan, Globalization of Ethics. 
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envisage more than one tradition as the cornerstone of their own life experience.
174
 
Probably their personal principles or private morality are in the end a mixture of many 
elements from both secular and religious aspects. Yet no matter secular, religious, or 
hybrid moralities, being tolerant to different ways of life and avoiding preconceptions 



















                                                          




Abe, Masamichi. Shinto ga yoku wakaru Hon: The New Guide to Shinto 神道がよくわ
かる本. Tokyo: PHP, 1997. 
 
 
Ames, Roger T. “Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative.” In Human Rights and the 




Appiah, Anthony K. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: 
Norton, 2006.  
 
 
―――. “Cosmopolitan Patriots.” Critical Inquiry 23, no.3 (Spring 1997): 617-639. 
 
 




―――, ed.  Debating Cosmopolitanism. London: Verso, 2003. 
 
 
Asano, Akemitsu. Shinto Shisou 神道思想 [Shinto ideas]. Tokyo: Risosha, 1943.  
 
 
Ashizu, Uzuhiko. “Shinto to Keiten 神道と経典” [Shinto and scriptures]. In Gendai 




Ashton, W. G, trans. The Nihongi, 1896. http://www.sacred-texts.com/shi/nihon1.htm.  
 
 
Asoya, Masahiko. “Shinto shisouka to „shi‟ no Mondai” 神道思想家と「死」の問題. 
In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道
研究集成 (8).  
 
 
Avonius, Leena, and Damian Kingsbury, ed. Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of 





―――. “Introduction.” In Avonius and Kingsbury, Human Rights in Asia: A 
Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate.  
 
 
“The Bangkok Declaration.” In Kymlicka and Sullivan, The Globalization of Ethics, 
Appendix G.  
 
 
Barry, Brian. “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique.” In Brilmayer and 
Shapio, Global Justice.  
 
 
Bauer, Joanne B, and Daniel A Bell, ed. The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 
New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
 
 
―――. “Introduction.” In Bauer and Bell, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. 
 
 
Beitz, Charles. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979. 
 
 
Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Boston and Massachusetts: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989.  
 
 
―――.  The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Translated by Matsuji Hasegawa. Tokyo: 
Kaigai Hyoronsha, 1946. 
 
 
Benhabib, Seyla. Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
 
―――. “Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical 
Community.” In Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, 














Brilmayer Lea and Ian Shapio, ed. Global Justice. New York: New York University 
Press, 1999.  
 
 
Brown, Chris, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger. International Relations in Political 
Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
 
 




―――.  “Introduction.” In Bruun and Jacobsen, Asian Values and Human Rights.  
 
 
Campbell, Tom. Justice, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.  
 
 
―――. “Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights: Inhumanity or Injustice?” In  
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right, edited by Thomas Pogge. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.  
 
 




Chan, Joseph. “The Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights: A Philosophical 
Appraisal.” In Human Rights and International Relations in the Asian- Pacific Region, 
edited by James H Tang. London: Pinter, 1995. 
 
 
―――. “Asian Values and Human Rights: An Alternative View.” In Democracy in East 




―――.  “Confucian Attitudes Toward Ethical Pluralism.” In Confucian Political Ethics, 





Chen, Jau-hwa. “Asia Values? Why Not, But How?” In Avonius and Kingsbury, Human 
Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate. 
 
 
Cohen, Robin and Steven Vertovec, ed. Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, 
and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
 
 
―――. “Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism.” In Cohen and Vertovec, 
Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice. 
 
 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10
th
 ed. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
 
Crowe, Michael B. The Changing Profile of Natural Law. The Hague: Nijihoff, 1977.  
 
 
Dallmayr, Fred. „“Asian Values‟ and Global Human Rights.” Philosophy East and West 
52, no.2 (April 2002): 173-189. 
 
 
―――. “Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory.” Perspectives on 
Politics 2, no.2 (June 2004): 249-257. 
 
 
Dinwiddy, John. Bentham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
 
Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977.  
 
 
Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Asian Values: a Defence of „Western 
Universalism‟.” In Bauer and Bell, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. 
 
 
―――. “Natural Law and Right in Aquinas‟ Political Thought.” The Western Political 
Quarterly 33, no. 4 (December 1980): 520-535.  
 
 
Erskine, Tony. „“Citizens of Nowhere‟ or „the Point Where Circles Intersect‟? Imperialist 






Freeman, Michael. “Universal Human Rights and Particular Cultures.” In Bruun and 
Jacobsen, Asian Values and Human Rights.  
 
 




―――. “Since There Is No East and There Is No West, How Could Either Be the Best?” 
In Bruun and Jacobsen, Asian Values and Human Rights.  
 
 
Fukui, Yoshihiko. “Keishin Suso.” In Kokugakuin University, Encyclopedia of Shinto, 
2007. http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=1211 . 
 
 
Funabiki, Takeo. „Nihonjinron’ Saiko「日本人論」再考 [Reconsidering Japaneseness]. 
Tokyo: NHK Shuttupan, 2003. 
 
 
Gabay, Clive. “Anarcho-Cosmopolitanism: The Universalization of the Equal 
Exchange.” Global Society 22, no. 2. (April 2008): 197-216. 
 
 
Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, ed. Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神
道研究集成 (7). Tokyo: Jinja Shinposha, 1999.  
 
 
Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, ed. Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神
道研究集成 (8). Tokyo: Jinja Shinposha, 1999.  
 
 
Glover, Jonathan and Martha Nussbaum, ed. Women, Culture, and Development: A Study 
of Human Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
 
Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
 
Hall, Stuart. “Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities.” In Cohen and 





Havel, Vaclav. “Transcending the Clash of Cultures: Democracy‟s Forgotten 
Dimension.” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 2. (April 1995): 3-10.  
 
 
Held, David. “Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?” In Perspectives on World 
Politics, 3rd ed, edited by Richard Little and Michael Smith. London: Routledge, 2006.  
 
 
Higuchi, Kozo. Nihonjin to Ninjo 日本人と人情  [Japanese and humanity]. Tokyo: 
National Seihon, 1994. 
 
 
Hirai, Naofusa. “Sengo 50nen niokeru Shinto Kyoka no Kaigan to Tenbou”  戦後 50 年
における神道教化の開眼と展望. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, 
Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8). 
 
 




―――.“Shinto Kyoka 神道教化” [Shinto edification]. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 
Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8). 
 
 
―――.“Shinto Kyoka” 神道教化 [Shinto edification]. In Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon 
Bunka Kenkyusho, ed. Shinto Jiten 神道辞典. 
 
 
Hobsbawn, Eric. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions.” In The Invention of Tradition, 




Hollinger, David A. “Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans Find 
Their Own Way.” In Cohen and Vertovec, ed. Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, 
Context, and Practice.  
 
 
Idemura, Katsuaki. Yoshida Shinto no Kisoteki Kenkyu 吉田神道の基礎的研究 [The 





―――. “Yuiitsu Shinto myoho yoshu no Seiritsu” 唯一神道妙法要集の成立 . In 








―――. Zuaki Zatsugaku Shinto 図解雑学神道  [Introduction to Shinto]. Tokyo: 
Namimesha, 2006.   
 
 
International Shinto Foundation, official website. http://www.shinto.org/isf/index.html. 
 
 
International Shinto Foundation, comp. Shape of Religion in the 21st Century- In Search 
of World Co-existence. Tokyo: International Shinto Foundation, 1997.  
 
 
―――, comp. Shinto-Its Universality. Tokyo: International Shinto Foundation, 1996. 
 
 
―――.  “Statement of Purpose.” http://www.shinto.org/eng/statement-e.html. 
 
 








Ishii, Sumio. “Kodai no Nihon Shinto to Shin Chikyubunka” 古代の日本神道と新地球
文化 [Ancient Japan‟s Shinto and new global culture]. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 
Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8).  
 
 
Ito, Satoshi. “Yoshida Shinto” 吉田神道 . In Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka 









Jenco, Leigh K.  „“What Does Heaven Ever Say?‟ A Methods-centered Approach to 








Kadobayashi, Fumio. „Nihon Shoki’ Shindaikan Zenchuyaku「日本書紀」神代巻全注
訳. Tokyo: Koshobo, 1999. 
 
 
Kaminoshi, Takamitsu and Minako Oba. Kojiki, Nihon Shoki 古事記、日本書紀 . 
Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1991. 
 
 








Kemerling,Garth. Philosophy Pages, 2006. http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/u.htm.  
 
 
Kingsbury, Damian. “Universalism and Exceptionalism in „Asia‟.” In Avonius and 
Kingsbury, Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate. 
 
 
Kojima, Setsuko and Momoo Yamaguchi, edited. A Cultural Dictionary of Japan. 
Tokyo: Kenkyusha, 1981. 
 
 










Konishi, Tomoshichi and Kosei Minamide, ed. Genius Eiwa Daijiten ｼﾞｰﾆｱｽ英和大辞
典 [Genius English-Japanese dictionary]. Tokyo. Taishukan, 2001-2002. 
 
 
Kubota, Osamu. “Yoshida Shinto no Seiritsu” 吉田神道の成立 [The birth of Yoshida 




―――. “Zenki Ise Shinto no Tenkai” 前期伊勢神道の展開 [The movement of early Ise 




Kukathas, Chandran. “Can Local Culture Survive Globalization?” Lecture at seminar on 
Global Political Theory held by Department of Political Science, National University of 
Singapore. September 11, 2008.  
 
 
―――. “Mirage of Global Justice.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 23, no.1 (2006): 1-28.   
 
 
―――. “Moral Universalism and Cultural Differences.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Theory, edited by John S Dryzek, et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
 
Kuroda, Toshio.  “Chusei Shakai to Ise Shinko” 中世社会と伊勢信仰 [Medieval society 
and faith in Ise]. In Kasahara and Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
―――. “Ise Shinto no Kyori” 伊勢神道の教理 [The dogma of Ise Shinto]. In Kasahara 
and Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
―――. “Shinto setsu no Hattutatsu” 神道説の発達 [Development of Shinto theology]. 
In Kasahara and Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
Kurozumi, Makoto. Hukususei no Nihon Shisou 複数性の日本思想 [The plurality of 





Kymlicka, Will. “Introduction”. In Kymlicka and Sullivan, The Globalization of Ethics.  
 
 
Kymlicka, Will and William M Sullivan, ed. The Globalization of Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
 
Maeda, Shigeki. “Shinto and Ancient Chinese Thought.” In Kokugakuin University, 




Madsen, Richard. “Confucianism: Ethical Uniformity and Diversity.” In Kymlicka and 
Sullivan, The Globalization of Ethics. 
 
 
Mahbubani, Kishore. “An Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Freedom of the 
Press.” In Ness, Debating Human Rights. 
 
 
Meiji Shrine website. http://www.meijijingu.or.jp/about/3-4.html. 
 
 




Miki, Shotaro. “Atsutane gaku no Seiritsu” 篤胤学の成立 [The formation in the study of 




Miller, David. “Justice and Equality.” In Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, 
edited by Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
 










Mizutani, Chiaki. „“Nihon Shoki‟ niokeru Ko to Chu”「日本書紀」における孝と忠 
[Piety and loyalty in „Nihon Shoki‟]. In Nihon Shoki Kenkyu 日本書紀研究 25, edited 
by Kenichi Yokota. Tokyo: Koshobo, 2003.  
 
 
Mouer, Ross and Yoshio Sugimoto. Images of Japanese Society. London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1986. 
 
 
―――. Nihonjinron no Houteishiki 日本人論の方程式. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1995.  
 
 
Murakami, Shigeyoshi. “Kyoha Shinto” 教派神道 [Sectarian Shinto]. In Kasahara and 
Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
―――. “Shinto” 神道. In Kasahara and Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
Muraoka, Noritsugu. Nihon Shisoushi Kenkyu 日本思想史研究  [The research on 
Japanese ideas].Tokyo: Iwanami, 1975.  
 
 
Murphy Mark. “The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics.” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. March 11 2008. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/. 
 
 




Nakane, Chie. Japanese Society. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1970. 
 
 




Nakanishi, Masayuki. “Ise Shinto” 伊勢神道 In Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka 





Nardin, Terry. “Ethical Traditions in International Ethics.” In Tradition of International 




―――. “International Political Theory and the Question of Justice.” International 
Affairs 82, no.3 (2006): 449-465. 
 
 
―――.“Justice and Coercion.” In International Society and Its Critics, edited by Alex J 
Bellamy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
 
―――. Justice and Inequality. Forthcoming. 
 
 
―――. Law, Morality, and the Relations of States. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983.  
 
 
Ness, Peter V, ed. Debating Human Rights. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. 
 
 












Nosco, Peter. “Buddhism and the Globalization of Ethics.” In Kymlicka and Sullivan, 
The Globalization of Ethics. 
 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. “Kant and Cosmopolitanism.” In Perpetual Peace Essays on Kant’s 
Cosmopolitan Ideal, edited by Mathias Lutz-Bachmann and James Bohman. London: 





―――. “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” In The Quality of Life, 
edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Clarendon Press.1993. 
 
 




Nussbaum, Martha and Joshua Cohen. For Love of Country. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. 
   
 
Okada, Shoji. “Medieval Shinto.” In Kokugakuin University, Encyclopedia of Shinto. 
2006.  http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=724. 
 
 
―――. “Ryobe Shinto no Seiritsushiki” 両部神道の成立式. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu 
Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (7). 
 
 
―――. “Shinto Gobusho” 神道五部書  [Five books of Shinto]. In Kokushi Taikei 
Shumoku Gedai Gekan 国史大系種目下代下巻, edited by Kanichi Minakawa and 
Nobuyosi Yamamoto. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2001. 
 
 
Omori, Shiro. Rekishi to Minzokugaku 歴史と民俗学 [History and folklore]. Tokyo: 
Iwasaki Bijutsusha, 1967. 
 
 
Ono, Sokyo. “„Keishinseikatsu no Koryo‟ ni tsuite” 「敬神生活の綱領」について. 
Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihonbunka Kenkyusho Shoho 国学院大学院日本文化研究所所
報 74. (December 1976).  
 
 




―――. “Shinto Kyogaku heno Josho” 神道教学への序章. Shinto Shukyo 神道宗教
104. (September 1979). 
 
 





Pagder, Anthony, ed. The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
 
Pelican, Jaroslav. The Vindication of Tradition. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1984.  
 
 
Philippi, Donald L, trans. Kojiki. Tokyo: Princeton University Press and University of 
Tokyo Press, 1969. 
 
 
Philpot, Daniel. “Global Ethics and the International Law Tradition.” In Kymlicka and 
Sullivan, The Globalization of Ethics. 
 
 
Poggi, Thomas. “The International Significance of Human Rights.” The Journal of Ethics 
4, no. 1/2 (2000): 45-69. 
 
 
―――. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. 
 
 
Rawls, John. The Law of People. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
 
 




Reiss, Han, edited. “Kant, Metaphysics of Morals.” In Political Writings, translated by 
Nisbet, H. B. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.  
 
 
Rentelen, Alison D. International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism. 
London: Sage, 1990. 
 
 




Richardson, Henry S. and Melissa S Williams, ed. Moral Universalism and Pluralism. 





Sakurai, Katsunoshin. “Kyodotai no Keisei ni okeru Shinto no Yakuwari” 共同体の形成
における神道の役割 [Shinto‟s role in the formation of communities]. In Gendai Shinto 
Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8).  
 
 
―――.  “Shinto‟s Role in the Formation of Communities.” In International Shinto 
Foundation, Shinto-Its Universality. 
 
 
Sakurai, Tokutaro. Shukyo to Minzokugaku 宗教と民俗学  [Religion and folklore]. 
Tokyo: Iwasaki Bijutsusha, 1969. 
 
 
Satz, Debra. “Equality of What among Whom? Thought on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, 
and Nationalism.” In Brilmayer and Shapio, Global Justice. 
 
 
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. New York: Random House, 1999.  
 
 
―――.  “Human Rights and Asian Values.” In Ethics and International Affairs, 2nd ed, 
edited by Joel H Rosental. Washington D.C: George Town University Press, 1999. 
 
 
Shomoto, Mitsumasa. “Shinto Kyoka Gaisetsu” 神道教化概説  [A view of Shinto 
edification]. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu 
Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8). 
 
 




Stammler, Rudolf. The Theory of Justice. New York: Macmillian, 1925. 
 
 
Sugawara, Shinkai. Nihon Buttukyo to Shingi Shinko 日本仏教と神祇信仰. [Japanese 
Buddhism and the Kami cult] Tokyo: Shunjusha, 2007.  
 
 
Sullivan, William M. “Ethical Universalism and Particularism: A Comparison of 





Svensson, Marina. “The Chinese Debate on Asian Values and Human Rights.” In Bruun 
and Jacobsen, Asian Values and Human Rights.  
 
 
Takahashi, Miyuki. “Ise Shinto Shisou no Hattuten to Keishou” 伊勢神道の発展と継承  
[The development and inheritance of Ise Shinto]. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 
Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (7).  
 
 
Tani, Seitei. Suika Shinto no Seiritsu to Tenkai 垂加神道の成立と展開  [The 
establishment and movement of Suika Shinto]. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 2001. 
 
 
Taylor, Charles. “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights.” In Bauer and 
Bell. The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. 
 
 
―――.  “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.  
 
 
Teeuwen, Mark. “Western Understanding and Misunderstanding of Shinto.” In 
International Shinto Foundation, Shinto-Its Universality. 
 
 




―――. “Ningenkan” 人間観 [The concept of human beings]. In Kokugakuin Daigaku 
Nihon Bunka Kenkyusho, Shinto Jiten 神道辞典. 
 
 
―――. “Rekishi kan” 歴史観 [The view of history].  In Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon 
Bunka Kenkyusho, Shinto Jiten 神道辞典. 
 
 
―――.“Shinto no Kihonkannen to Kyogaku”  神道の基本観念と教学 [The basic idea 






――― . “Shinto Shinko ni miru Yuiitsushinkyoteki Keiko 神道信仰にみる唯一神教的
傾向”. In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei  現
代神道研究集成 (8).  
 
 
―――. “Shinto to Seimei Rinri” 神道と生命倫理 [Shinto and ethics]. In Gendai Shinto 
Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8).  
 
 
―――. “Soshiki Shingaku no juritsu to Shingakusha no Ikusei: Keishinseikatsu no 
Koryo/Kaisetsu wo Meguttute” 組織神学の樹立と神学者の育成: 敬神生活の綱領・
解説をめぐって . In Gendai Shinto Kenkyu Shusei Henshu Iinkai, Gendai Shinto 
Kenkyu Shusei 現代神道研究集成 (8).  
 
 
Umeda, Yoshihiko. Shinto no Shisou 神道の思想  (1) [The idea of Shinto]. Tokyo: 
Yuzankaku, 1974.  
 
 




Veer, Peter V D. “Colonial Cosmopolitanism.” In Cohen and Vertovec, Conceiving 
Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice. 
 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “Cosmopolitan Norms.” In Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism. 
 
 
 ―――. “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative.” In The Rights of 
Minority Cultures, edited by Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
 
 




―――. Thick and Thin. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1994. 
 
 
―――. “Universalism and Jewish Value.” Twentieth Annual Morgenthau Memorial 
Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy. Transcript of the lecture delivered on May 15, 
126 
 




Weinstock Daniel M. “Value Pluralism, Autonomy, and Toleration.” In Richardson and 
Williams, Moral Universalism and Pluralism. 
 
 
Williams, Howard. Kant’s Critique of Hobbes. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003.  
 
 
Wood, Allen W, ed. Basic Writings of Kant. New York: The Modern Library, 2001. 
 
 




Yamamoto, Takeo. “Shinto” 神道. In Kasahara and Kawasaki, Shukyoshi 宗教史. 
 
 
Yazaki, Hiroyuki. “Shinto and Confucianism”. In Kokugakuin University, Encyclopedia 

















Three Foundation Principles 
1. To express gratitude for divine favour and the benefits of ancestors, and with a 
bright, pure, sincere mind to devote ourselves to the shrine rites and festivals. 
2. To serve society and others and, in the realization of ourselves as divine 
messengers, to endeavour to improve and consolidate the world. 
3. To indentify our minds with the Emperor‟s mind and, in loving and being friendly 
with one another, to pray for the country‟ prosperity and for peaceful co-existence 
and co-prosperity for the people of the world.
 
 
(Ono, Shinto, 82) 
 
Shinto Edification 
1. [O]n the domestic level, the promotion of Shinto-like character and development 
of peaceful and warm hearted homes. 
2. [O]n the regional level, the coexistence and co-prosperity of the people is aimed 
at through the invigoration of local society and the protection of tutelary kami. 
3. [A]t the national and international social levels...the goal is the elevation of the 
spiritual life of the nation and the establishment of Japanese political and cultural 
identity. Also, Japan should act in a manner befitting it as a member of the world 
community in the areas of mutual assistance between nations, international 
cooperation and coexistence.  
(Hirai, “Shinto Edification.”) 
